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Abstract 
This paper documents the evolving impact of childbearing on the work activity of mothers between 1787 
and 2014. It is based on a compiled data set of 429 censuses and surveys, representing 101 countries and 
46.9 million mothers, using the International and U.S. IPUMS, the North Atlantic Population Project, and 
the Demographic and Health Surveys. Using twin births (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1980) and same 
gendered children (Angrist and Evans 1998) as instrumental variables, we show three main findings: (1) 
the effect of fertility on labor supply is small and often indistinguishable from zero at low levels of 
income and large and negative at higher levels of income; (2) these effects are remarkably consistent both 
across time looking at the historical time series of currently developed countries and at a contemporary 
cross section of developing countries; and (3) the results are robust to other instrument variation, different 
demographic and educational groups, rescaling to account for changes in the base level of labor force 
participation, and a variety of specification and data decisions. We show that the negative gradient in 
female labor supply is consistent with a standard labor-leisure model augmented to include a taste for 
children.  In particular, our results appear to be driven by a declining substitution effect to increasing 
wages that arises from changes in the sectoral and occupational structure of female jobs into formal non-
agricultural wage employment as countries develop.   
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I. Introduction 
The relationship between fertility and female labor supply has been widely studied in 
economics.  For example, the link between family size and mother’s work decisions has been 
used to explain household time allocation and the evolution of women’s labor supply, 
particularly among rapidly growing countries in the second half of the 20th century (Carlinger, 
Robinson, and Tomes 1980; Angrist and Evans 1998; Del Boca, Pasqua, and Pronzata 2005; 
Cristia 2008; Bruijns 2014; and Hupkau and Leturcq 2016). Moreover, development economists 
have related the fertility-work relationship to the demographic transition and studied its 
implications for economic growth (Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla 2001).  Yet despite the 
centrality of these issues in the social sciences, there is no unified evidence on how this 
relationship has evolved over time and with the process of economic development.  
Our contribution is to provide such evidence that spans not only a plausible cross-section 
of countries at various stages of development but also historical examples from currently 
developed countries going back to the late 18th century. To provide consistent estimates over 
time and space, we use two common instrumental variables strategies: (i) twin births introduced 
by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) and applied repeatedly since (e.g., Bronars and Grogger 
1994; Black, Devereux, and Salvanes 2005; and Caceres-Delpiano 2006) and (ii) the gender 
composition of the first two children introduced by Angrist and Evans (1998).  We implement 
these estimators using four large databases of censuses and surveys: the Integrated Public Use 
Micro Sample (IPUMS) International (200 country-years), the IPUMS U.S. (15 U.S. censuses 
and 4 Puerto Rican censuses), the North Atlantic Population Project (18 country-years), and the 
Demographic and Health Surveys (192 low-income country-years). Together, the data covers 
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429 country-years, and 46.9 million mothers, stretching from 1787 to 2014 and, consequently, a 
large span of economic development.   
A natural starting point in thinking about the fertility-labor supply relationship is Angrist 
and Evans (1998). Based on U.S. IPUMS data from 1980 and 1990, Angrist and Evans find a 
negative effect of fertility on female labor supply using both gender mix and twin births as 
instruments for subsequent children, a result also established by Bronars and Grogger (1994).1  
Alternative instruments that rely on childless mothers undergoing infertility treatments in the 
U.S. and Denmark (Cristia 2008 and Lundborg, Plug, and Rasmussen 2016) or natural 
experiments like the introduction of birth control pills (Bailey 2013) or changes in abortion 
legislation (Bloom et al. 2009 and Angrist and Evans 1996) similarly conclude that children have 
a negative effect on their mother’s labor supply or earnings. This instrument-invariant robustness 
is particularly notable since each IV uses a somewhat different subpopulation of compliers to 
estimate a local average treatment effect.  That the results are consistent suggests fairly wide 
external validity (Angrist, Lavy, and Schlosser 2010 and Bisbee et al. 2015).     
However, we show that the negative relationship between fertility and mother’s work 
behavior holds only for countries at a later stage of economic development. At a lower level of 
income, including the U.S. and Western European countries prior to WWII, there is no 
relationship between fertility and mother’s labor supply. The lack of an impact at low levels of 
development is in-line with Aguero and Marks’ (2008, 2011) study of  childless mothers 
undergoing infertility treatments in 32 developing countries and Godefroy’s (2016) analysis of 
changes to women’s legal rights in Nigeria.  Strikingly, combining U.S historical data with data 
                                                            
1 For discussions of the validity of various fertility instruments, see for example Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000), 
Hoekstra et al. (2007), Angrist, Lavy, and Schlosser (2010), and Bhalotra and Clarke (2016).  Clarke (2016) 
provides a useful summary of the empirical literature.   
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from a broad set of contemporary developing countries, we find that the negative gradient of the 
fertility-labor supply effect with respect to economic development is remarkably consistent 
across time and space. That is, women in the U.S. at the turn of the 20th century make the same 
labor supply decision in response to additional children as women in developing countries today.  
Moreover, we show that the negative gradient is exceedingly robust to a wide range of data 
issues, including using alternative instruments, changing the sample specification, conditioning 
on covariates, using alternative measures of mother’s labor supply, and rescaling the estimates to 
account for varying rates of labor force participation over time.  
The empirical regularities we describe are consistent with a standard labor-leisure model 
augmented to include a taste for children. As wages increase during the process of development, 
households face an increased time cost of fertility but also experience increased income. With a 
standard constant elasticity of substitution utility function, the former effect dominates as 
countries develop, creating a negative gradient.   
Indeed, in exploring the mechanism behind our result, we document that the income 
effect from rising wages is invariant to economic development but the substitution effect falls 
from zero to negative and becomes economically important as real GDP per capita increases.  
We show that the patterns in the data cannot be explained by factors that might impact the cost of 
childcare as societies become wealthier, such as the declining presence of family members in or 
near the household or increased access to education.  We instead argue that the declining 
substitution effect arises from changes in the sectoral and occupational structure of female jobs, 
as in Schultz (1991).  In particular, as economies evolve, women’s labor market opportunities 
transition from agricultural and self-employment jobs to urban wage work.  Such wage work 
tends to be less compatible with raising children and causes some movement out of the labor 
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force (e.g. Jaffe and Azumi 1960; McCabe and Rosenzweig 1976; Kupinsky 1977; Goldin 1990; 
Galor and Weil 1996; Edwards and Field-Hendrey 2002; and Szulga 2013).  We further show 
that the negative gradient is steeper among those in non-professional occupations that might have 
less opportunity to find alternative childcare.  
Our key result – of a negative gradient to the fertility-labor supply relationship, ranging 
from roughly zero at low levels of development to significantly negative at higher income levels 
– has important implications both for understanding the historical evolution of women’s labor 
supply and the relationship between demographic transition and the process of economic 
development. As Goldin (1990) has documented in her comprehensive study of women’s work 
in the 20th century, women’s labor supply follows a U-shape over the process of economic 
growth, first declining before eventually increasing. Our results suggest that declining fertility 
rates as incomes increase may have contributed to the upswing in women’s labor supply in much 
of the developed world during the second half of the century.  The results also motivate recent 
studies of the role of family policies (Olivetti and Petrolgolo 2017) and childcare costs (Del Boca 
2015; Herbst 2015; and Kubota 2016) on female labor supply. At the other end of the economic 
development spectrum, our results suggest that the demographic transition to smaller families 
probably does not have immediate implications for women’s labor supply and growth. This in 
turn reinforces the idea suggested in the demographic transition literature  (e.g. Bloom, Canning, 
and Sevilla 2001) that family planning policies are unlikely to enhance growth through a labor 
supply channel (although such policies could still be desirable for other reasons). 
Our paper is organized as follows. We begin by sketching a model highlighting the key 
mechanism driving fertility’s impact on labor supply.  Section III explains our empirical strategy, 
followed in section IV by a description of the data.  Section V presents our findings, along with a 
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series of robustness checks.  Section VI analyzes potential channels for our results, and section 
VII briefly concludes.   
II. Sketch of a Model 
We believe many of the empirical patterns in the data can be explained within a standard 
labor-leisure model.  In particular, consider a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility 
function defined over consumption c, leisure d, and fertility n: 
(1)                     ܷሺܿ, ݀, ݊ሻ ൌ ቂߛሺܿ ൅ ܿ଴ሻఘ ൅ ߙ݀ఘ ൅ ߚ ቀ௡ேቁ
ఘቃ
ଵ ఘൗ
 
where c0 <0 is subsistence consumption and utility from fertility is relative to N, the potential 
reproductive capacity. Equation (1) is a CES variant of the model used by Bloom et al. (2009). 
Total time (normalized to 1) is allocated between leisure d, childcare bn (where b is the time cost 
per child), labor l, and non-market household work ߝ: 
(2)                     1 ൌ ݈ ൅ ݀ ൅ ܾ݊ ൅ ߝ     
Assuming households do not save, consumption is derived directly from earned income: 
(3)                       ܿ ൌ ݓ݈. 
Substituting equations (2) and (3) into (1), we obtain the household utility function: 
(4)                        ܸሺ݈, ݊ሻ ൌ ቂߛሺݓ݈ ൅ ܿ଴ሻఘ ൅ ߙሺ1 െ ݈ െ ܾ݊ െ ߝሻఘ ൅ ߚ ቀ௡ேቁ
ఘቃ
ଵ ఘൗ . 
The first order conditions are: 
(5)                       ߲ܸ ߲݈ൗ ൌ
ଵ
ఘ ݒ
ቀభഐିଵቁሾߩߛݓሺݓ݈ ൅ ܿ଴ሻఘିଵ െ ߙߩሺ1 െ ݈ െ ܾ݊ െ ߝሻఘିଵሿ ൌ 0 
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߲ܸ ߲݊ൗ ൌ
1
ߩ ݒ
ቀଵఘିଵቁሾെߙߩܾሺ1 െ ݈ െ ܾ݊ െ ߝሻఘିଵ ൅ ߚߩܰିఘ݊ఘିଵሿ ൌ 0 
where ݒ ≡ ቂߛሺݓ݈ ൅ ܿ଴ሻఘ ൅ ߙሺ1 െ ݈ െ ܾ݊ െ ߝሻఘ ൅ ߚ ቀ௡ேቁ
ఘቃ.  Re-arranging yields: 
(6)           
݈ ൌ ൫ߙ
ఏ െ ߙఏ߳ െ ݓఏߛఏܿ଴൯ െ ߙఏܾ݊
ݓఏାଵߛఏ ൅ ߙఏ  
݊ ൌ ߙ
ఏܾఏሺ1 െ ߝ െ ݈ሻ
ߚఏேషഐഇ ൅ ߙఏܾఏାଵ, 
where ߠ ≡ 1 ሺߩ െ 1ሻ⁄ . Note that in the solution: 
(7)     
߲݈
߲݊ ൌ െ
ߙఏܾ
ݓఏାଵߛఏ ൅ ߙఏ ൏ 0 
and ߲ଶ݈ ߲߲݊ݓ⁄ ൏ 0 if ߩ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ or the elasticity of substitution is between (0,∞). In other words, 
the model predicts that the effect of fertility on labor supply is negative and becomes more 
negative as the wage increases. As the wage increases, the agent experiences both a substitution 
and income effect. The former arises because an increase in the wage causes the price of leisure 
and the time-cost of children to also increase, leading to a substitution into labor and out of 
children.  Higher wages also increase income, which moves households away from labor and 
toward children.  When the elasticity of substitution is positive, the substitution effects tends to 
dominate, increasing the responsiveness of labor to fertility as the wage goes up.  
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 In a small number of low-income countries, including pre-WWI U.S., we show a positive 
labor supply response may be empirically relevant.  While this framework predicts a negative 
labor supply response to children, such a positive response is possible with a simple extension of 
the model.    Suppose there is a consumption (e.g., food) cost to children so ܿ ൌ ݓ݈ െ ݇݊, and for 
simplicity set c0 and ߝ to zero. The first-order condition with respect to labor, with 
rearrangement, now becomes: 
(8) 
݈ ൌ ߙ
ఏ ൅ ݊൫ݓఏߛఏ݇ െ ߙఏܾ൯
ݓఏାଵߛఏ ൅ ߙఏ . 
In this case ߲݈ ߲݊⁄ ൐ 0 is consistent with ݓ ൐ ߙఏܾ ߛఏ݇⁄ .  An increase in fertility implies an 
increased time cost but also reduces consumption, making increased labor more valuable. With a 
sufficiently high wage, the last effect can dominate leading to increased labor. In this case, 
߲ଶ݈ ߲߲݊ݓ⁄ ൏ 0 without further assumptions, so we would continue to expect a negative gradient 
of the fertility-labor relationship with respect to the wage.2   
III. Empirical Strategy  
Our empirical analysis adopts the standard approach of exploiting twin births and gender 
composition as sources of exogenous variation in the number of children to identify the causal 
effect of an additional child on the labor force activity of women (e.g. Rosenzweig and Wolpin 
1980; Bronars and Grogger 1994; Angrist and Evans 1998; and Black, Devereux, and Salvanes 
2005).  In particular, for twin births, consider a first stage regression of the form: 
                                                            
2 That is, sgnሺ߲ଶ݈ ߲߲݊ݓ⁄ ሻ ൌ sgn൫െߛఏ݇ߛݓఏ ൅ ߠ݇ݓିଵߙఏ ൅ ሺߠ ൅ 1ሻߙఏ൯ ൌ െ1 if  ߩ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ. 
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ሺ9ሻ				ݖ௜௝௧ ൌ ߛ ௜ܵ௝௧ ൅ 	ߩݓ௜௝௧ ൅ ߨ௝௧ ൅ ߤ௜௝௧ 
where ݖ௜௝௧ is an indicator of whether mother i in country j at time t had a third child,  the 
instrument ௜ܵ௝௧ is an indicator for whether the second (and third) child are the same age (twins), 
ݓ௜௝௧ is a vector of demographic characteristics that typically include the current age of the 
mother, her age at first birth, and indicators for the gender of the first two children, and ߨ௝௧ are 
country-year fixed effects.  ߛ measures the empirical proportion of mothers with at least two 
children who would not have had a third child in the absence of a multiple second birth.  
The local average treatment effect (LATE) among mothers with multiple children is 
identified from a second stage regression: 
	ሺ10ሻ		ݕ௜௝௧ ൌ ߚݖ௜௝௧ ൅ ߙݓ௜௝௧ ൅ ߠ௝௧ ൅ ߝ௜௝௧ 
where ݕ௜௝௧ is a measure of labor supply for mother i in country j at time t and	ߚ is the IV estimate 
of the pooled labor supply response to the birth of twins for women with at least one prior child.3  
We condition on one prior child, as in Angrist and Evans (1998), to provide a family-size-
consistent comparison so that both the same-gender and twins IV study the effect of a family 
growing from two to three children.   
While twins are a widely-used source of variation for studying childbearing on mother’s 
labor supply, it is by no means the only strategy in the literature.  Perhaps the leading alternative 
exploits preferences for mixed gender families (Angrist and Evans 1998).  In particular, Angrist 
and Evans estimate a first-stage regression like equation (9) but, for ௜ܵ௝௧, substitute twin births 
for an indicator of whether the first two children of woman i are of the same gender (boy-boy or 
girl-girl).  Again, the sample is restricted to women with at least two children and ߛ measures the 
                                                            
3 The reported estimates of ߚ are weighted by the household weights supplied by the various surveys or censuses, 
normalized by the number of mothers in the final regression sample.    
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likelihood that a mother with two same gendered children is likely to have additional children 
relative to a mother with a boy and a girl.   
Both twins and same gender children have been criticized as valid instruments on the 
grounds of omitted variables biases.  Twin births may be more likely among healthier and 
wealthier mothers, and can consequently vary over time and across geographic location (see e.g. 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin 2000; Hoekstra et al. 2007; Bhalotra and Clarke 2016; and Clarke 
2016).  While the same gender instrument has proven quite robust for the U.S. and other 
developed countries (Butikofer 2011), there are many reasons to be cautious in samples of 
developing countries (Schultz 2008).  Among other factors, there is the concern that same-gender 
siblings may be less costly to raise, leading to a violation of the exclusion restriction 
(Rosenzweig and Zhang 2009).  More directly, households may practice either sex selection or 
selective neglect of children based on gender (e.g. Ebenstein 2010 and Jayachandran and Pande 
2015).   
We adopt the broad view of Angrist, Lavy, and Schlosser (2010) that the sources of 
variation used in various IV strategies are different and, therefore, so are the biases.  As such, 
each IV provides a specification check of the other.  In this spirit, we also provide a series of 
LATE estimates that show a) twin results at alternative family parities, b) twins results of the 
same gender versus mixed gender,4 c) findings from a third instrument introduced by Klemp and 
Weisdorf (2016), which relies on exogenous variation in the timing of first births, and d) directly 
employ the methodology in Angrist, Lavy, and Schlosser (2010) that combines multiple IV 
                                                            
4 Monozygotic (MZ) twinning is believed to be less susceptible to environmental factors.  Hoekstra et al. (2007) 
provides an excellent survey of the medical literature. Since we cannot identify MZ versus dizygotic (DZ) twins in 
our data, we take advantage of the fact that MZ twins are always the same gender, whereas DZ twins share genes 
like other non-twin siblings and therefore are 50 percent likely to be the same gender.   
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estimates.5  Additionally, to the extent possible given our data, we show how our results vary 
when we control for education and health measures such as height and body mass index that 
have been highlighted as key determinants of twin births (Bhalotra and Clarke 2016).   
The literature analyzes a number of measures of ݕ௜௝௧, including whether the mother 
worked, the number of hours worked, and the labor income earned.  These measures are 
sometimes defined over the previous year or at the time of the survey.  In order to include as 
wide a variety of data across time and countries as possible, we typically focus on the labor force 
participation (LFP) of mothers at the time of a census or survey.  When LFP is unavailable, 
especially in some of the pre-WWII censuses, we derive LFP based on whether the woman has a 
stated occupation.  We show that changes in the outcome variable do not change the results. 
In concordance with much of the literature, our standard sample contains women aged 21 
to 35 with at least two children, all of whom are 17 or younger.  We exclude mothers who gave 
birth before age 15 and families where a child's age or gender is imputed. Furthermore, we drop 
mothers with an imputed age, who live in group quarters, or whose first child is a multiple birth.6  
It is worth emphasizing that the restrictions on mother’s (21-35) and child’s (under 18) age may 
further allay concerns about missing children that have already moved out of the household.  We 
also experiment with even younger mother and child age cut-offs, which additionally provides 
some inference about difference in the labor supply response to younger and older offspring.  
Further sample statistics, as well as results when these restrictions are loosened, are provided in 
the Appendix.   
                                                            
5 In particular, we combine all possible instrument variations: twins, two-boy, and two-girl.  
6 These restrictions depart from Angrist and Evans (1998).  The final restriction takes care of rare cases of triplets.   
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We present our results stratified by time, country, level of development, or some 
combination.  The prototypical plot stratifies countries-years into seven real GDP per capita bins 
(in 1990 U.S. dollars): under $2,500, $2,500-5,000, $5,000-7,500, $7,500-10,000, $10,000-
15,000, $15,000-20,000, and over $20,000.  To be concrete, in this example, all country-years 
where real GDP per capita are, say, under $2,500 in 1990 U.S. dollars are pooled together for the 
purpose of estimating equations (9) and (10).  Similarly, countries with real GDP per capita 
between $2,500 and $5,000, and so on, are also pooled together for estimation.   The plots report 
estimates of ߛ and ߚ, and their associated 95 percent confidence interval based on country-year 
clustered standard errors, for each bin. 
IV. Data 
We estimate the statistical model using four large databases of country censuses and surveys.      
a. U.S. Census, 1860-2010  
The U.S. is the only country for which we have consistent historical microdata over a 
long stretch of time.7  We use the 1 percent samples from the 1860, 1870, 1950, and 1970 
censuses; the 5 percent samples from the 1900, 1960, 1980, 1990, and 2000 censuses; the 2010 
American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year sample, which combines the 1 percent ACS samples 
for 2008 to 2012; and the 100 percent population counts from the 1880, 1910, 1920, 1930, and 
1940 censuses.8  Besides additional precision, the full count censuses allow us to stratify the 
                                                            
7 We have a sporadic time-series for Canada, UK, Ireland, and France as well. 
8 For information on the IPUMS samples, see Steven Ruggles, J. Trent Alexander, Katie Genadek, Ronald Goeken, 
Matthew B. Schroeder, and Matthew Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 5.0 [Machine-
readable database], Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2010. The 100 percent counts were generously provided 
to us by the University of Minnesota Population Center via the data collection efforts of ancestry.com. Those files 
have been cleaned and harmonized by IPUMS.  The 1890 U.S. census is unavailable and U.S. censuses prior to 1860 
do not contain labor force information for women.   
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sample by geography (e.g. states) to potentially take advantage of more detailed cross-sectional 
variation.   
IPUMS harmonizes the U.S. census samples to provide comparable coding of variables 
over time.  However, there are unavoidable changes to some of our key measures.  Perhaps most 
important, the 1940 census shifted our labor supply measure from an indicator of reporting any 
“gainful occupation” to the modern labor force definition of working or looking for work in a 
specific reference week.  Fortunately, there does not appear to be a measurable difference 
between these definitions.  When both measures are available in 1940, their state-level 
correlation is 0.95.  The 1940 census is also the first to introduce years of completed schooling 
and earnings; therefore, when we show results invoking education or earnings, we exclude U.S. 
data prior to 1940. 
While the 1880, 1920, 1930, and 1940 full count censuses are fully harmonized with the 
IPUMS samples, the 1910 full count census is not yet.  For our purposes, the most important 
feature missing from the unharmonized data is linkages matching children to mothers.  
Accordingly, we create these linkages ourselves using the IPUMS rules.9     
For Puerto Rico, we use the 5 percent census samples from 1980, 1990, and 2000.  As in 
the U.S., we also include the 2010 Puerto Rico Community Survey 5-year sample, which 
combines the 1 percent samples for 2008 to 2012.  Prior censuses are either missing labor force 
data or reliable information about real GDP per capita.   
                                                            
9 These rules are available upon request.  Of note, relationship linkages did not exist at the time Angrist and Evans 
(1998) was written. Nevertheless, we can nearly replicate their results using our linkage rules or the modern 
relationship variables, suggesting their absence in the 1910 census is not a significant issue. 
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b. IPUMS International Censuses, 1960-2011 
IPUMS harmonizes censuses from around the world, yielding measures of our key 
variables that are roughly comparable across countries and time.  We use data from 200 of the 
263 country-year censuses between 1960 and 2011 that are posted at the IPUMS-I website.10  
Censuses are excluded if mother-child links or labor force status is unavailable (57 censuses)11 or 
age is defined by ranges rather than single-years (6 censuses).12     
c. North Atlantic Population Project (NAPP), 1787-1911 
The North Atlantic Population Project (NAPP) provides 18 censuses from Canada, 
Denmark, Germany13, Great Britain, Norway, and Sweden between 1787 and 1911.  As with 
IPUMS data, these samples are made available by the Minnesota Population Center.14  For most 
samples, NAPP generates family interrelationship linkages. However, in a few cases (Canada for 
1852, 1871, and 1881 and Germany in 1819), such linkages are not available.  In those cases, we 
use similar rules developed to link mothers and children in the U.S. full count census.15  Also, 
consistent with the pre-1940 U.S. censuses, labor force activity is based on whether women 
                                                            
10 This information is as of June 28, 2016, when we downloaded the data.  The tabulations of available countries 
exclude the U.S. and Puerto Rico. 
11 This unfortunately affects some censuses from Canada and the U.K.  Similar to the U.S., the international linking 
variables use relationships, age, marital status, fertility, and proximity in the household to create mother-child links. 
Sobek and Kennedy (2009) compute that these linking variables have a 98 percent match rate with direct reports of 
family relationships.  
12 The 1971 to 2006 Irish censuses use ages ranges for adults but not for children younger than 20. Therefore, twins 
are identifiable and we do not exclude this data. 
13 The NAPP 1819 German data is from the small state of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, rather than the whole region of 
Germany.  However, we refer to it as Germany for expositional purposes. 
14 For additional information about the NAPP samples, see Minnesota Population Center (2015), North Atlantic 
Population Project: Complete Count Microdata, Version 2.2 [Machine-readable database], Minneapolis: 
Minnesota Population Center. 
15 Details are available upon request. 
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report an occupation rather than the modern definition of working or seeking work within a 
specific reference period, and education is unavailable.16   
d. Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), 1990-2015 
To collect additional observations from low-income environments, we supplement the 
censuses with the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), a series of nationally representative 
surveys of mothers and children in developing countries.17  There have been six waves of DHS 
surveys, beginning in the mid-1980s and running roughly every 5 years thereafter.  From the 
initial set of 254 country-year surveys, we exclude samples missing age of mother, marital status 
of mother, current work status, whether the mother works for cash, and birth history. These 
restrictions exclude the first wave of the DHS, when the surveys were in a relatively nascent 
state. Further excluding countries without valid real GDP per capita data (see below), we are left 
with 192 country-years, encompassing 692,923 mothers. 
As a detailed survey rather than a census, the DHS includes a number of questions that 
are especially valuable for testing the robustness of our census results.  The detailed health 
information allows us to control for characteristics that may be related to a mother’s likelihood 
of twinning (Bhalotra and Clarke 2016).  Moreover, the DHS indicates whether the children in a 
mother’s birth history are in fact twins. To keep the DHS results comparable to the censuses,18 
our baseline estimates identify twins based on the same census year-of-birth criterion.  Yet we 
still make use of the twin information to test how accurate our coding of census twins might be.  
                                                            
16 In the NAPP, the occupation definitions are based on the variables occgb, occhisco, and occ50us. Note that the 
NAPP occupation classifications are different than those used in the U.S. censuses, with the exception of the 
occupational coding used for Canada in 1911. 
17 For additional information about the DHS files see ICF International (2015). The data is based on extracts from 
DHS Individual Recode files. See http://dhsprogram.com/Data/. 
18 In addition, we only consider living children who reside with the mother to keep the DHS comparable with our 
census samples. 
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Indeed, Appendix Figure A1 shows the high degree of correspondence between twinning rates 
when we define twins using “real” multiple births and those imputed for children sharing the 
same birth-year.  
The DHS has a number of labor force variables but none that directly compare to those in 
the censuses.  We chose to use an indicator of whether the mother is currently working since it is 
most correlated with the IPUMS labor force measures (see Appendix Figure A2).   
e.  Real GDP per Capita 
 Real GDP per capita (in US$1990) is collected from the Maddison Project.19 To reduce 
measurement error, we smooth each GDP series by a seven year moving average that includes 
three trailing and three leading years around the census/survey.  We are able to match 429 
country-years to the Maddison data.20 This leaves a total of 46,892,809 mothers aged 21 to 35 
with at least two children who are present in our baseline estimates. 
When we split the 1930 and 1940 full population U.S. censuses into the 48 states and DC, we 
bin those samples by state-specific 1929 or 1940 income-per-capita.21 The income data are 
converted into 1990 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. 
f.   Summary Statistics 
                                                            
19 See http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm. 
20 In a few minor cases, we were not able to match a country to a specific year but still left the census in our sample 
because we did not believe it would have impacted their placement in a real GDP per capita bin.  In particular, the 
censuses of Denmark in 1787 and 1801 are matched to real GDP per capita data for Denmark in 1820 and Norway 
in 1801 is matched to data for Norway in 1820.  Excluding these country-years has no impact on our results.  More 
importantly, the Maddison data ends in 2010 and therefore censuses or surveys thereafter are assigned their most 
recently available real GDP per capita data. 
21 http://www2.census.gov/library/publications/1975/compendia/hist_stats_colonial-1970/hist_stats_colonial-
1970p1-chF.pdf. 
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Table 1 provides descriptive statistics separately for the U.S. and non-U.S. samples as 
well as by real GDP per capita bins. Not surprisingly given the large number of country-years 
from the DHS, 210 out of 429 samples are from countries outside the U.S. with an income below 
$2,500 (in 1990 U.S. dollars). Nevertheless, most GDP per capita bins have a large number of 
mothers for both the U.S. and non-U.S. samples. Summary statistics for a number of individual 
variables, including share in the labor force, number of children, mother’s age at survey, 2nd 
child is multiple birth, are also presented in Table 1. Appendix Table A1 additionally provides 
descriptive statistics for all country-year datasets. 
V. Results 
a. OLS Estimates 
We begin with a discussion of OLS estimates from regressions of the labor supply 
indicator on the indicator for a third child and the controls described above. These results do not 
have a clear causal interpretation, but they are useful for establishing some of the key patterns in 
the data. In Figure 1, we plot the coefficients for the U.S., the non-U.S. countries, and the 
combined world sample (labeled “All”).  Country-year observations are binned into seven ranges 
of real GDP per capita, as reported on the x-axis (e.g. $0-2,500, $2,500-5,000, etc.). The results 
for the U.S. and non-U.S. samples corresponding to Figure 1 are shown in Table 2.22  
All three plots exhibit a similar pattern. At low levels of real GDP per capita, the OLS 
estimate of the effect of children on mother’s labor supply is negative and statistically significant 
at the 5 percent level but small in magnitude (e.g. -0.021 (0.004) in the lowest GDP bin). As real 
GDP per capita increases, the effect becomes more negative, ultimately flattening out between -
                                                            
22 In this and subsequent figures, we present 95 percent confidence interval bands based on standard errors clustered 
at the country-year level. 
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0.15 and -0.25 beyond $15,000 for all three samples. Appendix Figure A3 shows similar 
evidence for four countries – Canada, France, Ireland, and the U.K. – for which we have census 
data at various points of their development cycle.23  In these cases, we see a similar, albeit 
noisier, negative gradient as these economies grow. 
In Figure 2, we plot the U.S.-only results over time. 24  The OLS estimates starts out 
negative, albeit relatively small (e.g. -0.011 (0.004) in 1860 and -0.013 (0.0004) in 1910), 
decrease from 1910 to 1980, at which point the magnitude is -0.177 (0.001), and flattens 
thereafter.  Note that due to the sample size, 95 percent confidence intervals are provided but not 
visible at the scale of the figure.  
Figure 3 plots the OLS estimates by real GDP per capita separately by time periods (pre-
1900, 1900-1950, 1950-1989, and 1990+). Years prior to 1950 combine U.S. census and NAPP 
data. Years thereafter include all four of our databases.  The same general pattern appears within 
time periods.25  The effect of fertility on labor supply tends to be small at low levels of GDP per 
capita but increases as GDP per capita rises. 
b. Twins IV 
The left panel of Figure 4 shows the first-stage effect of a twin birth on our fertility 
measure, the probability of having three or more children. For the U.S., non-U.S., and combined 
world samples, there is a notable positive and concave pattern, with the first-stage increasing 
with higher real GDP per capita up to $15,000 or so and flattening thereafter.  Note that the 
                                                            
23 There are four Canadian censuses from 1871-1911, four British censuses from 1851-1991, eight Irish censuses 
from 1971-2011, and eight French censuses from 1962-2011.   Pre-WWII microdata are not available for the Irish 
and French censuses.  We also do not have access to British or Canadian census microdata around WWII and cannot 
identify households in some of the more recent IPUMS samples. 
24 Blue circles represent IPUMS samples and red diamonds represent full population counts. We take the high 
degree of correspondence between the estimates in years with both as validation of our implementation of mother 
linkages in the full count data. 
25 Relative to Figure 1, we had to combine some real GDP per capita bins because of small sample sizes within these 
tight time windows. 
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regression specification controls for the mother’s age, but does not, indeed cannot, control for the 
number of children or target fertility.  Therefore, the positive gradient over real GDP per capita 
reflects the negative impact of income on target fertility and hence the heightened impact of a 
twin birth on continued fertility relative to a non-twin birth.26  Regardless, in all cases, the 
instrument easily passes all the normal statistical thresholds of first-stage relevance, including 
among countries with low real GDP per capita and high fertility rates.  
The right panel of Figure 4 plots ߚ, the instrumental variables effect of fertility on 
mother’s labor supply.27  In the world sample, ߚ is mostly statistically indistinguishable from 
zero among countries with real GDP per capita of $7,500 or less.  Thereafter, it begins to decline 
and eventually flattens out between -0.05 and -0.10 at real GDP per capita at around $15,000 and 
higher.28 The results for the U.S. and non-U.S. samples are similar in that there is a notable 
negative gradient with respect to real GDP per capita. For example, above $20,000, the U.S. 
estimate is -0.070 (0.008) while the non-U.S. estimate is -0.104 (0.002).   
In Figure 5, we show the U.S. twin results by census decade.  The pattern is broadly 
similar to the previous figure. The magnitude of the first stage is increasing over time, and the 
second-stage IV results exhibit a pronounced negative gradient, particularly post-WWII.29   The 
same pattern appears within time periods (Figure 6), and notably begins to decline prior to 1990, 
well before modern fertility treatments, like IVF, became widely used in wealthy countries.  
                                                            
26 The first stage coefficient, ߛ, is E{z=1|S=1,w} – E{z=1|S=0,w}. Mechanically, E{z=1|S=1,w}=1 because of the 
definition of twins. This means that if, for example, ߛ=0.6, then E{z=1|S=0,w}=0.4, implying that 40 percent of 
mothers would have a third child if their second child is a singleton. The increasing coefficient over real GDP per 
capita means having a third child after a singleton second child is declining with development. 
27 The point estimates and standard errors from Figure 4 are also shown in Table 2. 
28 By comparison, Angrist and Evans (1998) report a twins IV estimate of -0.087 for the 1980 U.S. census.  
29 In our binned samples, we only include the U.S. full population for 1880 and 1910 to 1940. However, we display 
the single-year estimates from the IPUMS random samples for these years in Figures 2 and 5. We take the high 
degree of correspondence between the 1910 IPUMS and full population estimates as validation of our 
implementation of mother linkages. 
20 
 
Finally, the pattern appears across data sets (Appendix Figure A4) and geographic regions of the 
world (Appendix Figure A5), including four other developed countries in which we have longer 
time-series but highlighted by the U.K. and Ireland, where we can estimate ߚ at both low- and 
high-income periods in their history (Appendix Figure A6). 
c. Are There Positive Labor Supply Effects Among the Lowest Income Countries? 
One surprising finding is that at low real GDP per capita levels, we sometimes estimate a 
positive labor supply response to childbearing.  That is particularly evident in the pre-WWI U.S. 
estimates displayed in Figure 5, although there are periodically positive but not statistically 
significant effects for some of the low-income post-1990 countries as well.30  The U.S. positive 
results are not statistically significant different from zero for the early census samples (1860, 
1870), but they are for the full population counts of 1880 and 1910.   
While these positive results are not artifacts in the statistical sense, it is worth noting that 
the underlying rates of labor force participation for U.S. women are very low at this time in 
history (e.g. 6.2 and 11.8 percent for 1880 and 1910 mothers, respectively). As such, a positive 
effect could reflect that low income mothers are more likely to work after having children, for 
example because subsistence food and shelter are necessary, whereas childcare might be cheaply 
available.  Section II discusses a simple extension to our theoretical model, the introduction of a 
consumption cost to children, which implies the potential for a positive labor supply response to 
additional children.  Such a framework may be especially relevant for the subpopulation of 
compliers for the local average treatment effect – that is, mothers induced to have children who 
would not have otherwise. 
                                                            
30 See Appendix Figures A5.  On the regional figure, the estimates tend to be not statistically, nor economically, 
different from zero at low income levels, with the exception of a single pooled sample from Asia, which is positive 
and significant. The Asian sample between $5,000-7,500 consists of 462,553 observations from 14 country-years. 
The pooled result for these 14 samples is almost completely driven by Turkey in 1990 and 2000, which have IV 
estimates of 0.200 (0.023) and 0.150 (0.017) and make up 163,770 and 180,069 observations, respectively. 
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To gain further insight into the low real GDP sample results, we split the U.S. 1930 and 
1940 full population counts by state of residence and pool states into income-per-capita 
estimation bins (matching what we did with countries in previous figures). Figure 7 shows the 
now familiar upward sloping pattern to the first stage results by real income per capita. In the 
second stage, we see that the effect of fertility on labor supply is in general statistically 
indistinguishable from zero at low income levels in 1930 and 1940 and overlaps with the low-
income post-1990 non-U.S. results (shown in the green line).  But we also find a small positive 
effect from the lowest income states in 1930, seemingly corroborating the positive estimates 
from a lower income U.S. pre-WWI.31  
d. Same Gender IV 
Next, we discuss results, displayed in Figure 8, that use the same gender instrument.32 
Like the twins IV, we estimate a positive gradient to the first stage with respect to real GDP per 
capita, although the interpretation of this pattern is different than for twins. In particular, the 
same-gender first-stage picks up the increased probability that a mother opts to have more than 
two children based on the gender mix of her children (rather than picking up the proportion of 
mothers with incremental fertility when the twin instrument is zero, i.e., for non-twin births).  
Most importantly, we again see a negative gradient on the second stage IV estimates, from a 
close-to-zero effect among low GDP countries to a negative and statistically significant effect at 
higher real GDP per capita that flattens at around $15,000.  Again, the negative estimates appear 
in the U.S. post-WWII (Appendix Figure 7). 
                                                            
31 For the 1930 census, the states in that lowest bin ($2,000-3,000) are: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, New Mexico, South Carolina, and Tennessee.  
32 The point estimates and standard errors from Figure 8 are shown in Table 2. 
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Our main intention is to highlight the similar shapes of the labor supply effect across the 
development cycle, despite using instruments that exploit difference sources of variation.33  
Indeed, not surprisingly, when we combine all possible instrument variation into a singled 
pooled estimator, as in Angrist, Lavy, and Schlosser (2010), our weighted average twin and same 
gender IV results also, unsurprisingly, shows the same strong negative gradient.  That said, the 
magnitude of the same gender IV result is larger than the twin IV result at the high GDP per 
capita bins.34 Since this is a local average treatment effect, this disparity suggests a greater effect 
of fertility on labor supply for those women induced to have an incremental child based either on 
son preference or the taste for a gender mix compared to those encouraged to higher fertility by a 
twin birth.   
e. Hours 
The results thus far are reported for the extensive labor force participation margin.  
Figure 9 plots twin IV results for the number of hours worked per week among women that are 
working (the intensive margin).  We include all country-years that contain a measure of hours 
worked, which unfortunately limits us to 38 censuses.35  Nevertheless, we again find no evidence 
of a labor supply response among mothers in low-income countries and a negative response of 
about 0.8 hours per week among mothers in higher-income countries.  As a benchmark, 
employed mothers work, on average, just under 33 hours per week in countries with real GDP 
                                                            
33 Like the twins estimates, we also find additional systematic evidence of a positive fertility-labor supply effect at 
low levels of income, which are statistically significant for the 1910, 1930, and 1940 U.S. censuses (see Appendix 
Figure A7). 
34 For example, at the $20,000 and above bin, the twin estimate is -0.070 (0.008) for the U.S. sample and -0.104 
(0.002) for the non-U.S. sample.  By comparison, the same gender estimates are -0.121 (0.008) for the U.S. sample 
and -0.174 (0.020) for the non-U.S. sample.   
35 We can use eight U.S. censuses (1940-2010) and 30 censuses from other countries.  The DHS and NAPP do not 
contain information about hours worked per week.  When hours are reported as a range, we use the center of the 
interval.   
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per capita above $20,000, suggesting a roughly 2½ percent average decline in hours as a result of 
an additional child, conditional on working.  
f. Robustness 
f.1 Omitted Variables and Alternative Sources of Identification 
As noted above, twin and same gender instruments are susceptible to omitted variables 
biases. These biases are likely to differ across instrument, suggesting that the twins and same 
gender IV estimates can be specification checks of each other (Angrist, Lavy, and Schlosser 
2010).  However, in this subsection, we push this idea further by providing three other sets of 
estimates that exploit alternative sources of instrument variation or control for observable 
characteristics that are known to explain variation in the treatment.   
First, we examine a third instrument for fertility – the time that elapses between the 
parents’ marriage and the couple’s first birth (“time to first birth” or TFB) – introduced by 
Klemp and Weisdorf (2016).36  A long line of research in demography and medicine (e.g. 
Bongaarts 1975) uses birth spacing, not necessarily limited to first births, as an indicator of 
fecundity.  Some of these papers also document the extent to which spacing is unrelated to many 
observable characteristics.37  Klemp and Weisdorf argue that TFB is especially hard to predict 
based on observable characteristics outside of parent age and consequently is a valid indicator of 
ultimate family size.  Unfortunately, TFB requires marriage and birth dates which are generally 
only available in the DHS.  Therefore, we cannot replicate the negative gradient across the 
development cycle.  However, we find the TFB IV estimates are near zero, and perhaps even 
                                                            
36 Unfortunately, our data does not allow us to systematically study other instruments used in the literature, such as 
the use of infertility treatments (Cristia 2008; Aguero and Marks 2011; Lundborg, Plug, and Rasmussen 2016), 
changes in access to birth control (Bailey 2013), or other policy changes (Bloom et al. 2009; Godefroy 2016). 
37 For evidence otherwise, see Feng and Quanhe (1996), Basso, Juul, and Olsen (2000), and Juul, Karmaus, and 
Olsen (1999). 
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slightly positive, at low real GDP per capita levels, and similar to twin IV and same gender 
estimates at the same GDP level.38   
Second, our baseline twin birth estimates condition on families with one child and 
compare those who then have a twin birth to those who have a singleton birth.  Again following 
Angrist, Lavy, and Schlosser (2010), we condition on different family size parities to capture 
variation from different sets of mothers.  For example, one might expect that mothers with a 
large number of previous children would be less likely to adjust their labor supply in response to 
unexpected incremental fertility (for example, because of low incremental childcare costs for 
higher births). Indeed, as shown in Figure 10, we observe a stronger first stage effect for the 
sample that conditions on more children, especially at higher income levels.  In the second stage, 
we see a notably, although not always statistically significantly, more negative effect in high-
income countries for women starting with one child.  However, the pattern of results is similar 
regardless of how many children are in the household when the twins are born. In all family size 
circumstances (up to three initial children), we continue to find no effect among low income 
countries and an increasingly larger negative effect among higher income countries, flattening 
out around $20,000 per capita.  
Finally, it has been noted by many researchers, most recently Bhalotra and Clarke (2016), 
that mothers of twins are positively selected by health and wealth.39   We provide additional two 
pieces of evidence that this selection process is not driving the negative labor supply gradient.  
First, when we control for the observable characteristics that have been highlighted by Bhalotra 
and Clarke (2016), such as mother’s education, medical care availability, and mother’s health, 
                                                            
38 The TFB IV estimates using the DHS data are: 0.031 (0.018), 0.047 (0.015), and 0.044 (0.014) for the $0-2,500, 
$2,500-5,000, and $5,000-10,000 GDP per capita bins, respectively.  
39 Related, Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) argue twins are less costly to raise than two singleton births spaced apart.  
While we cannot fully address this concern, we can restrict the analysis to mothers with close birth-spacing. 
Appendix Figure A8 shows that this restriction has little effect on the gradient.   
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our results are statistically identical to the baseline estimates without these controls.40  Second, a 
strand of the medical literature argues that there is a different process of selection into 
monozygotic and dizygotic twins (see e.g. Hoekstra et al. 2007). The proportion of dizygotic 
twins is affected by environmental and genetic factors of the type discussed by Bhalotra and 
Clarke (2016). By contrast, the proportion of monozygotic twins appears to be relatively constant 
over time (and thus the development cycle) and therefore unaffected by their omitted variables 
bias concern. Of course, we cannot identify monozygotic and dizygotic twins in our data but we 
can exploit the fact that monozygotic twins are always same gender, whereas dizygotic twins are 
an equal mix of same and opposite gender (like non-twin siblings).41  In Figure 11, we report that 
results are statistically indistinguishable across same and opposite gender twins, lending 
additional credence to the view that our results are not driven by omitted variable bias with 
respect to twinning.   
f.2  Alternative Development Benchmarks 
The labor supply patterns we have documented thus far are based on an economy’s real 
GDP per capita.  The key model prediction, however, is based on the substitution and income 
effects arising from changes to a woman’s wage.  Unfortunately, data limitations make it 
difficult to show full world results stratified by female (or overall) wages.  Instead, we examine 
two alternative exercises.   
                                                            
40 Appendix Figure A9 plots the results with and without mother’s education covariates using all available censuses 
and the DHS.  Health measures are available only in the DHS.  We are able to roughly replicate Bhalotra and 
Clarke’s association between twinning and doctor availability, nurse availability, prenatal care availability, mother’s 
height, mother’s BMI (underweight and obese dummies), and infant mortality prior to birth.   When we specifically 
control for these measures, our labor supply IV estimates are identical to the baseline for the <$2,500 bin and only 
slightly larger but statistically and economically indistinguishable for the $2,500-$5,000 bin (-0.006 (0.031) versus 
0.001 (0.032)) and $5,000 and over bin (-0.075 (0.042) versus -0.068 (0.044)). 
41 The rate of monozygotic twinning is approximately 4 per 1000 births and is constant across various subgroups 
(Hoekstra et al. 2007). Under the standard assumption that dizygotic twins have a 50 percent chance of being the 
same gender, approximately 43 to 59 percent of same-gender twins are monozygotic across the various GDP bins. 
Notably, the proportion of monozygotic twins will be highest in low-GDP countries, where Bhalotra and Clarke 
(2016) find the potential for the omitted variable bias is greatest. 
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First, we use the 1940 to 2010 U.S. censuses to compute average female real wage rates 
by state and census year.42   Analogous to the real GDP per capita bins used in prior figures, 
state-years are stratified into four real hourly wage bins, ranging from $0 to $6 up to $12 to $19, 
based on the average wage in the state at that time.  Similar to the GDP per capita results, we 
find no labor supply effect at the lowest two real wage levels and larger negative effects as the 
real hourly wage rises (Figure 12).   Second, we report IV results from the U.S. and non-U.S. 
samples stratified by the average education level of women aged 21 to 35 (Figure 13).43  We 
again find no effect at low education levels (below 9 years) but decreasing negative effects 
thereafter.  
f.3   Other Data Issues 
There are several variable definition decisions that could conceivably be problematic.  
One of these decisions was to label siblings born in the same year as twins since few censuses 
record multiple births or the birth month/quarter.44  This classification raises the risk that two 
births in the same calendar year could be successive rather than twins (so-called Irish twins). 
Fortunately, some of our data provide quarter or month of birth or direct measures of multiple 
births, allowing us to compare twins based on more precise birth dates with our baseline year-of-
birth twins. The black line in Figure 14 represents our baseline reported in earlier figures.  The 
blue line uses a subset of countries with quarter or month of birth.  By and large, we see a very 
similar negative gradient despite a notably smaller sample of country-years.  To make the 
                                                            
42 There is no wage data prior to 1940. For all persons aged 18 to 64, we calculate the average hourly wage rate as 
annual earned income divided by weeks worked times hours worked per week. The age range overlaps with the 
cohort of mothers used in our baseline sample but we do not condition on gender or motherhood. The results are 
robust to using the average wage rate of men or women only as well.  Wages are inflation adjusted using the 
consumer price index to 1990 dollars.  We top- and bottom-coded the wage at the 1st and 99th percentiles in each 
census prior to taking means.  
43 Again, data availability limits our analysis to 1940 and later. We also exclude 30 country-years where years of 
education are not provided.  By 1940, U.S. women in their twenties and thirties had, on average, at least 9 years of 
education.  Consequently, the U.S. is included only in the two highest education bins (9-12 and 12+ years). 
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comparison cleaner, we also re-estimated the baseline year-of-birth estimates with the sample of 
countries that provide quarter or month of birth (red line).  Although the pattern gets noisier with 
smaller sample sizes, the twin estimates based on year-of-birth appear to be, if anything, biased 
away from zero in low-income countries. 
A second measurement issue relates to our labor supply outcome.  As mentioned earlier, 
our historical results (1930 and earlier) must use occupation-based labor force participation, 
coding women as in the labor force if they report an occupation.  Post-1940, we use the modern 
definition based on whether the person is working or searching for work at the time of the 
survey.  We show that this change in definition has no impact on our results in two ways.  First, 
we use the 1940 U.S. census to compare across-state results using both measures. We find a 0.95 
cross-state correlation between the two LFP measures and a 0.82 correlation of the state-level IV 
results (Appendix Figure A11).  Second, Figure 15 shows that our baseline trend across real 
GDP per capita is essentially invariant to the use of an occupation-based LFP.  The patterns are 
also similar if we use employment (versus in the labor force) or worked over the prior year 
(rather than at the time of the census or survey). 
More broadly, our findings are robust to a number of other reasonable tweaks to our 
specification, variable definitions, and sample selection, such as excluding country-year fixed 
effects45 and alternative ways to specify the mother’s age and age at first birth covariates, as well 
as parsing the sample by age, age at first birth, education, and marital status of the mother.46  
While we find consistently larger negative effects among single (relative to married) and 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
44 Another measurement concern relates to non-biological children.  Child-parent biological relationships are not 
consistently available across censuses.  However, when we have that information, we find that restricting our sample 
to biological children has little impact on the results (see Appendix Figure A10). 
45 In the absence of fixed effects, the fertility effect is positive at some low income levels. However, that result is 
driven by some outliers in our data (e.g., Nicaragua in 1998 with an estimate of 0.385 (0.040) based on 3,733 
mothers). 
46 These figures can be found in Appendix Figures A12 to A16.   
28 
 
younger (relative to older) mothers, especially in countries with higher GDP per capita, those 
cases still exhibit the same negative gradient across development.  Moreover, there is no 
statistical or economic difference across gender and mother’s education at any level of GDP per 
capita. 
Lastly, we also used the methods proposed by Angrist and Fernandez-Val (2010) and 
Bisbee et al. (2015) to calibrate our IV estimates to a common LATE, namely the LATE for 
compliers in the U.S. in 1980.47  That refinement has no impact on the results (Appendix Figure 
A17).  
VI. Channels 
This section explores some of the potential mechanisms that account for the remarkably robust 
negative income gradient of mother’s labor supply response to children.48 
a. Accounting for Base Rates of Labor Force Participation 
One possibility is that the negative gradient is simply a function of the base rate of labor 
force participation.  With respect to our theoretical model, a lower base rate of labor force 
participation would imply more corner (݈ ൌ 0) cases, for which there is no scope for a negative 
fertility effect on labor supply. This mechanically limits the scale of any average causal effect of 
fertility. We can account for this possibility by rescaling estimates to the relevant base rate.  The 
logic of this rescaling is based on the assumption that effects tend to be monotonic in the 
population under study.  That is, write the average effect in population s as, 
(11) ߚ௦ ൌ ܧ௦ሾ ଵܻ െ ଴ܻሿ,  
                                                            
47 This calculation targets the estimation to the covariate distribution of compliers in the U.S. in 1980. 
48 As the main area of interest is the causal labor supply effect of children and the strength of the instruments are 
apparent, we stop reporting the first-stage estimates.  For brevity, we concentrate solely on the twin estimates. 
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where ଵܻ and ଴ܻ	are potential labor outcomes (with support {0,1}) under the condition of three or 
more children and less than three children, respectively.  Effect monotonicity implies ଵܻ ൑ ଴ܻ, 
which also means 
(12) ܧ௦ሾ ଵܻ െ ଴ܻ| ଴ܻ ൌ 0ሿ ൌ 0.  
This further implies that 
(13) ߚ௦ ൌ ܧ௦ሾ ଵܻ െ ଴ܻ| ଴ܻ ൌ 1ሿEୱሾ ଴ܻሿ,  
in which case the average effect of having three or more children among those for which there 
can be an effect is given by 
(13) ߚ௦௥ ൌ ܧ௦ሾ ଵܻ െ ଴ܻ| ଴ܻ ൌ 1ሿ ൌ ߚ௦Eୱሾ ଴ܻሿ. 
 
Comparing trends in ߚ௦ versus ߚ௦௥ allows us to assess the influence of base participation rates.  
For example, suppose we have two populations, s and s’, perhaps corresponding to the same 
country but at different points in time, or perhaps corresponding to two different countries at 
different levels of development.  Then, if ߚ௦ ൏ ߚ௦ᇲ, but ߚ௦௥ ൌ ߚ௦ᇲ௥  and ܧ௦ሾ ଴ܻሿ ൏ ܧ௦ᇲሾ ଴ܻሿ, we could 
infer that the effect of fertility among those for whom an effect is possible is constant, but that an 
increase in the base rate of participation from population s to s’ leads to a stronger average effect 
when taking all women in the populations into account.  Such a pattern of evidence would 
suggest no fundamental change in the way fertility tends to affect labor supply.  If, however, we 
see that ߚ௦௥ ൏ ߚ௦ᇲ௥  then this would suggest that the negative gradient in the average effect is not 
simply a function of changes in the base rate. 
This rescaling only recovers a meaningful effect in populations for which the 
monotonicity assumption is reasonable.  We have already noted that for some of our country-
year samples we estimate positive fertility effects, in which case this rescaling strategy would not 
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be applicable.  The analysis here is applied only to the country-year samples for which we 
observe either negative or (statistically indistinguishable from) zero fertility effects. 
Given that we are estimating complier LATEs via IV, the populations indexed by s 
correspond to the compliers in our various country years. As such, the relevant base rate, ܧ௦ሾ ଴ܻሿ, 
corresponds to the labor force participation rate among compliers with instrument values equal to 
0.  We compute these complier-specific rates using the IV approach of Angrist, Pathak, and 
Walters (2013).49  
Figure 16 shows the results of applying the rescaling to the baseline estimates.  For the 
US, the rescaling results in a substantial flattening past $7,500 per capita.  For the non-US 
populations, the rescaled estimates are consistent (taking into account the uncertainty in the 
estimates) with a flattening after $10,000 per capita.  However, a negative gradient is still evident 
over lower levels of income.  This indicates that the decline in the labor supply effect of an 
additional child is not solely driven by increases in the base rate of mother’s LFP and motivates 
further analysis into the channel driving the negative gradient, particular over income levels 
under $10,000 per capita.  The analyses below examine results both with and without the base-
rate rescaling. 
b. Changes to the Income and Substitution Effect Across Stages of Development 
We believe the remaining negative gradient is due to a declining substitution effect, in 
combination with an unchanging income effect resulting from increasing wages for women 
during the process of economic development. 
We identify the substitution effect primarily through changes in job opportunities.  This 
exercise is motivated by previous work that documents a U-shape of female employment with 
                                                            
49 Specifically, we stack the two-stage estimation used in Angrist, Pathak, and Walters to calculate the complier-
control mean with our baseline two-stage least squares regression to get the covariance between the base rate and the 
labor supply effect. 
31 
 
development in the U.S. (Goldin, 1990) and across countries (Schultz 1991 and Mammen and 
Paxson 2000).  Schultz (1991) shows that the U-shape is not observed within sector.  Rather, it is 
explained by changes in the sectoral composition of the female labor force.  In particular, women 
are less likely to participate in unpaid family work (mostly in agriculture) and self-employment 
and more likely to be paid a wage in the formal sector in the later stages of the development 
process. In addition, we have reason to believe that the changes in the types of jobs that women 
have over time might become less compatible with raising children. For example, in rural 
agricultural societies, women can work on family farms while simultaneously taking care of 
children but the transition to formal urban wage employment is less compatible with providing 
care at home (Jaffe and Azumi 1960; McCabe and Rosenzweig 1976; Kupinsky 1977; Goldin 
1990; Galor and Weil 1996; Edwards and Field-Hendrey 2002; and Szulga 2013).  
Given that consistent information on occupations and sectors across our many samples is 
limited, we rely on two coarse indicators of job type that can be consistently measured in almost 
all of our data. First, we try to capture the distinction between urban/rural and formal/informal 
occupations by comparing women who work for a wage versus those who work but are unpaid. 
These results, unscaled (left) and scaled (right), are presented in Figure 17. We find consistent 
evidence that the changing relationship between fertility and labor supply is driven by women 
who work for wages. The response from women who are working but not for wages is small and 
statistically indistinguishable at different levels of real GDP per capita. Note again, that since 
these are rescaled estimates the gradient – or lack thereof – is driven not by changes in aggregate 
levels of labor force participation at different levels of GDP per capita, but by changes in the 
labor-childbearing tradeoff at the individual level.   
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A second proxy of sectoral shifts is whether women work in the agricultural or non-
agricultural sectors (Figure 18). Although the scaled results presented in the right plot are 
unfortunately noisy for agricultural labor, the labor supply response of women in non-
agricultural sectors becomes clearly more negative as real GDP per capita rises.  
In settings where nearly all labor is in the formal sector, it becomes especially hard to 
identify differences in the effects of women's labor market opportunities. In light of the inherent 
selection problem around observed wages, the fertility response literature has long used a 
woman's education to proxy for the type of jobs and wages available to her. While Gronau 
(1986) documents several results finding education is correlated with fertility response, this 
correlation appears to reverse once Angrist and Evans (1998) apply instrumental variables. We 
find no strong heterogeneity by education (Appendix Figure A15). We also observe in Figure 19 
that fertility has almost no differential effect across the development cycle on female labor 
supply to professional occupations, despite the fact that these occupations tend to have higher 
wages.50 Instead, the changing gradient seems to be driven entirely by women who work in non-
professional occupations, suggesting either that education and professional status are poor 
proxies for the substitution effect, or that the opportunity differences they capture are small in 
comparison to the sectoral shifts out of agricultural and non-wage work.  
By contrast, we believe the income effect of rising wages is likely small and invariant to 
the stage of development.51  We show this in two ways.  First, we look at the husband’s labor 
supply response to children using the same twin IV estimator.  A long literature, tracing back to 
                                                            
50 Professional occupations are defined somewhat differently across data sources.  For the U.S., we use 
the 1950 occupation codes. For IPUMS-I, we use the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) 
occupation codes.  For the NAPP, we use the Historical ISCO codes, except for 1911 Canada where we use 1950 
U.S. occupation codes. We dropped the 1851 and 1881 U.K censuses due to difficulty convincingly identifying 
professionals.   For the DHS, we use their occupation codes.   
51 Henceforward, we will present the unscaled IV estimates since changes in the base rate of mothers’ work are less 
of a concern.   
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classic models of fertility such as Becker (1960) and Willis (1973), argues that an increase to the 
husband’s wage increases the demand for having children, possibly because men spend less time 
rearing children.  That is, the income effect is dominant.  In Figure 20, we return to the unscaled 
estimates and show that the husband’s labor supply response is economically indistinguishable 
from zero and invariant to the level of real GDP per capita.  
Second, we use the 1940 to 2010 U.S. censuses, which contain hourly wages of 
husbands, to measure the differential labor supply response of women throughout the hourly 
wage distribution of their spouse. One version of those results, where mothers are stratified into 
three real wage groups of their husbands ($0-10, $10-$16 and above $16 measured in 1990 
dollars), is displayed in Figure 21.52  Generally, we do not find a differential response, again 
suggestive that the income effect is unlikely to be a driver of the negative gradient in the labor 
supply response to children over the development cycle. 
c. Changes to Family Structure 
Next, we explore an alternative explanation, which we refer to as a family structure 
channel.  According to this view, the increased time cost of looking after children in our model is 
driven by changes in family composition that come with development, such as fewer 
opportunities for non-parent members of the household to help with childcare or household 
chores.  Indeed, a large body of work has analyzed the decline of intergenerational co-residence 
over time (e.g. Ruggles 1994).  We explore this potential channel by using the information 
available in our data to locate the presence of a grandparent or, more generally, any non-mother 
female older than 15 in the household. These results are presented in Figures 22 and 23.  
                                                            
52 Figure 21 is an extension of Figure 12, where the states are grouped into bins by the average wage of all 18-64 
year olds and mothers are separated within bins by their spouse’s wage. 
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Strikingly, we find little difference in the results by co-residence of grandparents or other non-
mother adult females.   
As further corroborating evidence, we find that the labor supply responses of U.S. 
mothers who still reside in their birth state, and thus are more likely to live near their own 
parents or other family members, are not different from U.S. mothers who migrate away from 
their state of birth (Figure 24).  Consequently, changes in the family structure, and their 
implication on the price of access to childcare, do not appear to drive our main results. 
Finally, the structure of the nuclear family also has potential implications for childcare 
costs.  Older children in the household may reduce the incremental cost of childcare, reducing 
the need for mothers to adjust their labor supply after an incremental birth.   Moreover, more 
eligible workers, whether they are older children or husbands, may also offset some of the labor 
supply consequences of motherhood.   On the other hand, having young children may increase 
childcare costs.  Figures 25 and 26 stratify the samples based on the age of the oldest and 
youngest child (ages 0-6, 7-12, or 13-17), respectively.  Again, in every case, we see a near-zero 
labor supply response to children at low levels of real GDP per capita, a declining labor supply 
elasticity at real GDP per capita around $7,000 - $15,000, and a large, relatively constant 
negative effect above $15,000.   
d. Changes to Schooling Opportunities for Children  
 A related possibility is that development changes access to school. Given the rise of 
universal schooling around the world, children spend more time in school and less time at home 
during their childhood, and this could reduce the need for childcare. First, we explore whether 
access to schooling influences the labor supply responses of mothers using the 1930 and 1940 
U.S. full population counts.  We split the U.S. state-years by the share of school-age kids in 
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school and by the stringency of compulsory schooling laws.53  We find no differential mother 
labor supply response when we stratify states by the earliest age of required schooling or by the 
total number of mandated schooling years (Appendix Figures A18 and A19).  Second, we find 
no difference in country-years that have a higher than 80 percent school attendance rate for 
children aged 5 to 18 and those who do not.54  We also find no differential response when we 
stratify U.S. states by the earliest age of required schooling or by the total number of mandated 
schooling years.  Therefore, we conclude that there is little evidence that access to schooling can 
explain the labor supply patterns we document.  
VII. Conclusion 
In her magisterial monograph of the evolution of women’s work in the United States, 
Goldin (1990) documents and dissects the now-classic U-shaped evolution of women’s labor 
supply over the 20th century. At the same time, she notes the paucity of historical causal evidence 
on the link between fertility and labor supply. A parallel literature in development economics has 
investigated the implications of evolving patterns of fertility in developing countries on 
economic growth (and implicitly labor supply). While there have been notable and pioneering 
studies on the effect of fertility on labor supply in developing countries, these studies naturally 
tend to focus on single countries or non-causal evidence.  
Using a twin birth and same gender of the first two children as instruments for 
incremental fertility, this paper links these two literatures by examining causal evidence on the 
evolution of the response of labor supply to incremental fertility across a wide swath of countries 
in the world and over 200 years of history. Our paper has two robust findings. First, the effect of 
fertility on labor supply is small, indeed typically indistinguishable from zero, at low levels of 
                                                            
53 Compulsory schooling laws are taken from Goldin and Katz (2003). 
54 These results are insensitive to choosing 70 or 90 percent thresholds. 
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income, and negative and substantially larger at higher levels of income. Second, the magnitude 
of these effects is remarkably consistent across the contemporary cross-section of developing 
countries and the historical time series (using primarily U.S. census data but also other 
developed-country historical samples from the NAPP), as well as across demographic and 
education groups.   
Our results are consistent with a standard labor-leisure model. As income increases, 
individuals face an increased time cost of looking after children but also experience higher 
incomes.  Our results suggest the former dominates the latter.  This substitution effect seems to 
come from changes in the sectoral and occupational structure of female jobs, in particular the rise 
of non-professional, non-agricultural wage work that flourishes with development. 
We see three implications of our results. First, in thinking about the U-shaped pattern of 
labor force participation that has been widely document in the economic history literature, our 
results suggest that decreases in fertility play a significant causal role in explaining part of this 
effect. As fertility rates have declined over the latter half of the 20th century, the responsiveness 
of labor supply to fertility has increased, contributing to increases in female labor force 
participation. Second, among developing countries, our results however suggest that changes in 
fertility tend not to have a large impact on labor force participation, arguing against fertility-
reduction policies specifically motivated by women’s labor force participation and its 
contribution to growth. Third, at least when it comes to fertility and labor supply, our results 
point to a remarkable consilience between historical and contemporary developing country data, 
suggesting that each of these disciplines has important insights for the other. 
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Figure 7 - U.S. States in 1930 and 1940, Twin IV
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Figure 8 - Same Gender IV, by Real GDP/Capita
U.S. non-U.S. All
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Figure 9 - Hours Conditional on Working, Twin IV
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Figure 10 - Different Child Parities, Twin IV
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Figure 11 - By Gender of Twins
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Figure 12 - Alternative Development Benchmark
 by U.S. State Mean Hourly Wage, 1940-2010, Twin IV
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Figure 13 - Alternate Development, by Benchmark by Female Education, Twin IV
U.S. non-U.S. All
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Figure 14 - By Definition of Twins
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Figure 15 - By Alternative Labor Supply Measures, Twin IV 
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Rescaled by Complier-Control Outcome Mean
Figure 16 - Twin IV, by Real GDP/Capita
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Figure 17 - By Class of Worker, Twin IV 
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Figure 18 - By Agricultural Occupation of Worker, Twin IV 
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Figure 19 - By Professional Occupation of Worker, Twin IV 
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Figure 20 - By Husband and Wife, Twin IV
Wives Husbands
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Figure 21 - By State and Husband Wage, U.S. 1940-2010, Twin IV
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Figure 22 - By Presence of Grandparent, Twin IV
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Figure 23 - By Number of non-Mother Adult Women in Household, Twin IV
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Figure 24 - By Mother's State of Birth, U.S., Twin IV
Stays in State of Birth Leaves State of Birth
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Figure 25 - By Age of Oldest Child, Twin IV
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Figure 26 - By Age of Youngest Child, Twin IV
0-6 7-12 13-17
Age of Youngest Child:
GDP N. Mothers N. Samples In Labor Force
3 or More 
Children
2nd Child is 
Multiple Birth
Number of 
Children (in 
Household)
Mother's Age 
at Survey
Mother's Age 
at First Birth
First Child is 
Boy
Second Child is 
Boy
Age of First 
Child
Age of Second 
Child
0-2,500 32,531               2 5.1% 62.5% 0.74% 3.27 29.02 21.04 50.8% 50.7% 7.99 5.18
2,500-5,000 2,557,639         2 6.2% 63.9% 0.68% 3.32 28.99 20.95 50.7% 50.8% 8.04 5.31
5,000-7,500 12,959,066       3 9.2% 55.5% 0.86% 3.09 29.30 21.13 50.6% 50.6% 8.17 5.46
7,500-10,000 4,706,116         2 10.6% 47.0% 0.87% 2.88 29.48 20.94 50.8% 50.8% 8.54 5.66
10,000-15,000 470,378             1 22.8% 55.1% 1.70% 2.99 29.30 21.40 51.0% 50.8% 7.90 5.28
15,000-20,000 598,515             2 46.8% 39.0% 1.29% 2.58 29.68 21.07 51.2% 51.0% 8.61 5.68
20,000-35,000 1,312,550         3 62.9% 36.6% 1.46% 2.50 30.28 21.85 51.1% 50.9% 8.42 5.17
0-2,500 9,006,590         210 43.9% 56.7% 1.22% 3.04 29.07 20.67 50.6% 51.5% 8.39 5.42
2,500-5,000 7,529,849         99 36.0% 50.9% 1.05% 2.97 29.82 21.19 51.1% 51.0% 8.63 5.50
5,000-7,500 4,132,620         51 37.2% 46.3% 1.22% 2.77 29.41 20.45 50.9% 50.8% 8.96 5.79
7,500-10,000 1,474,565         17 32.4% 46.5% 1.36% 2.76 29.46 20.74 51.1% 50.7% 8.72 5.58
10,000-15,000 592,503             18 36.4% 37.1% 1.21% 2.63 29.97 21.64 51.4% 51.1% 8.33 5.28
15,000-20,000 454,756             11 58.8% 29.3% 1.18% 2.39 30.84 22.79 51.5% 51.3% 8.05 4.78
20,000-35,000 1,065,131         8 73.8% 29.0% 1.43% 2.38 31.23 24.00 51.2% 51.1% 7.23 3.99
Non-US
US
Table 1 - Sample Summary Statistics by GDP Group
US non-US
GDP N. Mothers N. Samples LFP N. Mothers N. Samples LFP FS 2S FS 2S FS 2S FS 2S
0-2,500 32,531               2 5.1% 9,006,590        210 43.9% -0.018 -0.021 0.345 0.119 0.418 -0.001 0.015 -0.068 0.029 -0.048
(0.006) (0.004) (0.018) (0.005) (0.019) (0.009) (0.007) (0.162) (0.007) (0.020)
2,500-5,000 2,557,639         2 6.2% 7,529,849        99 36.0% -0.023 -0.057 0.345 0.035 0.470 -0.014 0.009 0.036 0.030 -0.019
(0.000) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.037) (0.011) (0.000) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012)
5,000-7,500 12,959,066       3 9.2% 4,132,620        51 37.2% -0.033 -0.089 0.452 0.009 0.542 -0.002 0.014 0.037 0.035 -0.038
(0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.020) (0.016) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.013)
7,500-10,000 4,706,116         2 10.6% 1,474,565        17 32.4% -0.064 -0.113 0.541 -0.017 0.523 -0.035 0.021 0.073 0.032 0.015
(0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.027) (0.014) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.036)
10,000-15,000 470,378             1 22.8% 592,503           18 36.4% -0.117 -0.137 0.452 -0.033 0.597 -0.091 0.035 -0.084 0.035 -0.059
(0.001) (0.024) (0.002) (0.010) (0.065) (0.016) (0.001) (0.034) (0.004) (0.036)
15,000-20,000 598,515             2 46.8% 454,756           11 58.8% -0.171 -0.265 0.594 -0.063 0.730 -0.117 0.050 -0.125 0.041 -0.185
(0.010) (0.037) (0.045) (0.015) (0.037) (0.034) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.028)
20,000-35,000 1,312,550         3 62.9% 1,065,131        8 73.8% -0.149 -0.249 0.636 -0.070 0.706 -0.104 0.049 -0.121 0.038 -0.174
(0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.020)
Same-Sex IV
US non-US
Table 2 - Baseline Estimates by GDP Group
US non-US
OLS Twin IV
US non-US
  
 
Appendix 
0
.0
1
.0
2
.0
3
Y
ea
r-
of
-B
irt
h 
Tw
in
 R
at
e
0 .01 .02 .03
Actual Twin Rate
Figure A1 - Comparison of Twinning Rates in DHS 
Corr: .87
0.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
M
ea
n 
of
 D
H
S
 V
ar
ia
bl
e
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Mean of IPUMS-I LFP
Corr: .75
Any Current Work
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
M
ea
n 
of
 D
H
S
 V
ar
ia
bl
e
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Mean of IPUMS-I LFP
Corr: .45
Any Current Work for Cash
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
M
ea
n 
of
 D
H
S
 V
ar
ia
bl
e
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Mean of IPUMS-I LFP
Corr: -.3
Any Current Work for Cash away from Home
Figure A2 - Comparison of DHS Work Measures with IPUMS LFP 
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Figure A3 - OLS, By Country and Real GDP/Capita
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Figure A4 - By Data Source, Twin IV
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Figure A5 - By Region, Twin IV
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Figure A6 - Twin IV, By Country and Real GDP/Capita
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Figure A7 - Same Gender IV, U.S. by Time
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Figure A8 - Spacing of Births, Twin IV
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Figure A9 - Robustness to Education, Twin IV
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Figure A10 - Robustness to Non-Biological Children
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Figure A11 - Alternative Measures of Labor Force Participation by State
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Figure A12 - Robustness to Specification, Twin IV
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Figuer A13 - By Age of Mother, Twin IV
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Figure A14 - By Age of Mother at First Birth, Twin IV
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Figure A15 - By Mother's Education, Twin IV
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Figure A16 - By Marital Status, Twin IV
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Figure A17 - Reweight Covariates to U.S. 1980 Compliers, Twin IV
Baseline Reweight Age Bins
Reweight Age, Education Bins
-0.30
-0.25
-0.20
-0.15
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
β
$2-3
k
$3-4
k
$4-5
k
$5-6
k
$6-7
k
$7-8
k
$8-1
2k
Real State Income/C ($1990)
Figure A18 - By US Schooling Age of Entry, 1930-1940, Twin IV
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Figure A19 - By US Schooling Mandated Years, 1930-1940, Twin IV
9+ Years 0-8 Years
State's Total Mandated Years of Schooling:
Country
Year 
(#Samples)
Source N
Percent of 
Pooled
Mean GDP/C In Labor Force
3 or More 
Children
2nd Child is 
Multiple Birth
Mother's Age 
at Survey
Mother's Age 
at First Birth
Education?
Month/Quarter 
of Birth?
OLS FS, Twin IV 2S, Twin IV FS, Same-Sex 2S, Same-Sex
Pooled 212 9,039,121 $1,333 43.8% 56.7% 1.22% 29.1 20.7 -0.021 0.418 -0.001 0.029 -0.048
(0.004) (0.019) (0.009) (0.007) (0.020)
Bangladesh 1991 IPUMS-I: Asia 702,804 7.78% $647 4.1% 62.3% 1.09% 28.5 19.7 X -0.026 0.429 0.023 0.027 -0.027
(0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.001) (0.017)
Bangladesh 1993 DHS 3,703 0.04% $684 17.2% 59.6% 0.39% 27.9 18.4 X X -0.069 0.555 0.002 0.041 -0.240
(0.015) (0.059) (0.197) (0.015) (0.308)
Bangladesh 1996 DHS 3,272 0.04% $749 38.6% 57.3% 0.41% 28.1 18.3 X X -0.047 0.368 -0.875 0.051 0.205
(0.020) (0.066) (0.279) (0.016) (0.356)
Bangladesh 1999 DHS 3,590 0.04% $827 22.7% 54.8% 0.46% 28.3 18.5 X X -0.067 0.515 0.071 0.067 -0.276
(0.017) (0.036) (0.236) (0.016) (0.229)
Bangladesh 2001 IPUMS-I: Asia 754,996 8.35% $885 8.2% 50.9% 1.01% 29.0 19.7 X -0.022 0.495 0.084 0.037 -0.192
(0.001) (0.002) (0.008) (0.001) (0.018)
Bangladesh 2004 DHS 3,825 0.04% $991 23.5% 52.1% 0.51% 28.2 18.3 X X -0.059 0.580 -0.054 0.052 -0.338
(0.017) (0.055) (0.157) (0.016) (0.305)
Bangladesh 2007 DHS 3,438 0.04% $1,125 34.3% 46.2% 0.64% 28.4 18.5 X X -0.100 0.416 0.438 0.092 -0.116
(0.021) (0.048) (0.308) (0.018) (0.204)
Bangladesh 2011 IPUMS-I: Asia 466,242 5.16% $1,276 5.8% 40.0% 0.65% 29.2 19.5 X -0.021 0.623 0.003 0.067 -0.023
(0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.001) (0.010)
Bangladesh 2011 DHS 5,606 0.06% $1,276 11.5% 40.7% 0.41% 28.4 18.4 X X -0.057 0.627 0.153 0.091 0.129
(0.010) (0.036) (0.155) (0.014) (0.108)
Benin 1996 DHS 1,620 0.02% $1,195 92.2% 59.5% 1.00% 28.5 20.6 X X -0.025 0.311 -0.598 0.017 1.169
(0.016) (0.083) (0.467) (0.020) (1.670)
Benin 2001 DHS 1,741 0.02% $1,302 92.1% 58.6% 1.21% 28.9 20.7 X X 0.004 0.454 0.166 0.010 0.159
(0.017) (0.050) (0.022) (0.019) (1.385)
Benin 2006 DHS 5,847 0.06% $1,360 88.0% 61.0% 1.63% 28.9 20.8 X X -0.005 0.449 -0.038 0.010 -0.440
(0.011) (0.031) (0.080) (0.011) (1.002)
Bolivia 1992 PUMS-I: America 33,935 0.38% $2,265 44.3% 62.2% 0.78% 29.1 20.5 X -0.043 0.376 -0.002 0.016 0.237
(0.006) (0.013) (0.081) (0.005) (0.345)
Bolivia 1994 DHS 2,391 0.03% $2,354 57.9% 63.7% 0.87% 29.2 20.6 X X -0.059 0.342 -0.430 0.036 0.556
(0.026) (0.058) (0.323) (0.019) (0.688)
Brazil 1960 PUMS-I: America 164,570 1.82% $2,296 8.5% 68.0% 0.74% 28.7 20.8 X -0.037 0.331 0.018 0.014 0.024
(0.002) (0.006) (0.025) (0.002) (0.096)
Brazzaville (Cong 2005 DHS 1,651 0.02% $2,091 70.7% 51.9% 1.47% 28.6 20.3 X X 0.030 0.433 0.117 -0.006 0.290
(0.030) (0.052) (0.218) (0.025) (4.119)
Burkina Faso 1996 IPUMS-I: Africa 58,935 0.65% $885 76.9% 65.1% 1.59% 28.6 19.7 X X 0.007 0.301 0.067 0.005 0.019
(0.004) (0.009) (0.045) (0.003) (0.658)
Burkina Faso 2006 IPUMS-I: Africa 80,012 0.89% $1,122 66.6% 61.9% 1.89% 28.5 19.9 X X 0.032 0.368 -0.030 0.002 -2.061
(0.004) (0.007) (0.033) (0.003) (3.243)
Burkina Faso 1993 DHS 1,982 0.02% $833 61.5% 65.0% 0.60% 28.6 20.0 X X -0.028 0.419 -0.165 0.017 -0.945
(0.031) (0.052) (0.399) (0.019) (1.749)
Burkina Faso 1998 DHS 1,870 0.02% $934 70.9% 61.7% 0.70% 28.6 20.1 X X 0.010 0.434 0.074 0.016 1.316
(0.027) (0.086) (0.294) (0.019) (2.020)
Burkina Faso 2003 DHS 3,569 0.04% $1,046 92.0% 61.8% 0.76% 28.7 20.0 X X 0.038 0.372 -0.331 0.022 0.421
(0.016) (0.046) (0.268) (0.016) (0.586)
Burkina Faso 2010 DHS 5,722 0.06% $1,234 79.7% 62.7% 0.97% 28.6 20.0 X X 0.001 0.455 -0.032 0.012 0.502
(0.015) (0.038) (0.131) (0.011) (1.076)
Cambodia 1998 IPUMS-I: Asia 65,026 0.72% $1,183 82.7% 60.9% 0.62% 29.6 21.0 X 0.010 0.380 -0.140 0.028 0.073
(0.004) (0.013) (0.055) (0.003) (0.108)
Cambodia 2000 DHS 3,705 0.04% $1,325 72.3% 60.0% 0.39% 29.9 21.2 X X -0.005 0.430 0.383 0.035 -0.221
(0.020) (0.047) (0.200) (0.016) (0.498)
Cambodia 2005 DHS 3,619 0.04% $1,929 64.5% 50.5% 0.53% 29.4 20.9 X X -0.078 0.457 0.056 0.058 -0.341
(0.022) (0.060) (0.268) (0.017) (0.335)
Cambodia 2008 IPUMS-I: Asia 63,509 0.70% $2,316 87.6% 45.9% 0.88% 29.2 20.6 X 0.005 0.547 -0.041 0.048 0.070
(0.003) (0.010) (0.027) (0.003) (0.055)
Cambodia 2010 DHS 3,761 0.04% $2,450 70.0% 41.9% 0.19% 29.1 21.0 X X -0.073 0.438 0.009 0.064 -0.005
(0.022) (0.050) (0.275) (0.017) (0.291)
Cambodia 2014 DHS 4,031 0.04% $2,450 71.5% 38.5% 0.51% 30.1 21.4 X X -0.129 0.668 -0.127 0.042 -0.344
(0.021) (0.040) (0.210) (0.017) (0.421)
Cameroon 1976 IPUMS-I: Africa 32,831 0.36% $1,058 49.1% 63.9% 2.20% 28.4 19.8 X X -0.025 0.376 -0.008 -0.008 0.107
(0.006) (0.008) (0.050) (0.005) (0.675)
Cameroon 1987 IPUMS-I: Africa 47,169 0.52% $1,472 48.7% 66.2% 2.89% 28.2 19.8 X -0.036 0.377 -0.023 0.003 -1.401
(0.005) (0.006) (0.036) (0.004) (2.149)
Cameroon 1991 DHS 1,061 0.01% $1,154 66.0% 71.7% 1.16% 28.2 19.5 X X -0.108 0.361 -0.706 0.016 1.047
(0.038) (0.077) (0.301) (0.025) (2.672)
Cameroon 1998 DHS 1,300 0.01% $1,033 78.2% 64.5% 1.31% 28.6 19.9 X X 0.003 0.364 0.211 0.032 -0.174
(0.028) (0.065) (0.205) (0.023) (0.718)
Cameroon 2004 DHS 2,434 0.03% $1,139 71.3% 62.3% 1.13% 28.3 20.1 X X -0.022 0.446 -0.022 -0.015 0.746
(0.024) (0.037) (0.195) (0.018) (1.584)
Cameroon 2005 IPUMS-I: Africa 83,411 0.92% $1,149 48.9% 68.0% 6.83% 28.5 20.0 X X -0.017 0.470 0.043 -0.013 -0.085
(0.004) (0.003) (0.015) (0.003) (0.263)
Cameroon 2011 DHS 3,690 0.04% $1,179 73.0% 62.7% 1.74% 28.4 20.3 X X -0.023 0.427 0.123 0.019 0.349
(0.020) (0.029) (0.122) (0.015) (0.909)
Canada 1871 NAPP 2,014 0.02% $1,718 1.1% 71.9% 0.36% 29.3 21.4 -0.014 0.208 0.139 0.022 -0.034
(0.010) (0.072) (0.203) (0.021) (0.238)
Canada 1881 NAPP 178,949 1.98% $1,955 2.2% 68.5% 0.69% 29.3 21.7 X -0.013 0.298 -0.011 0.009 0.036
(0.001) (0.006) (0.013) (0.002) (0.082)
Canada 1891 NAPP 14,506 0.16% $2,343 6.9% 66.9% 0.41% 29.5 21.8 X 0.003 0.336 -0.041 0.002 2.140
(0.006) (0.031) (0.111) (0.008) (9.979)
Central African R 1994 DHS 1,514 0.02% $568 83.3% 63.8% 0.45% 28.4 20.0 X X 0.015 0.422 0.191 -0.016 -1.022
(0.023) (0.094) (0.239) (0.022) (1.831)
Chad 1996 DHS 2,348 0.03% $448 45.1% 69.4% 0.94% 28.2 19.5 X X -0.028 0.421 0.540 -0.039 -0.718
(0.029) (0.059) (0.243) (0.016) (0.631)
Chad 2004 DHS 1,874 0.02% $643 77.0% 68.2% 0.18% 28.1 19.4 X X 0.008 0.460 -0.069 -0.026 0.549
(0.030) (0.090) (0.316) (0.023) (0.984)
China 1982 IPUMS-I: Asia 570,519 6.31% $1,224 87.0% 48.1% 0.46% 30.2 22.0 X -0.024 0.566 -0.024 0.068 -0.043
(0.001) (0.006) (0.012) (0.001) (0.013)
China 1990 IPUMS-I: Asia 614,197 6.79% $1,955 89.3% 30.4% 0.85% 29.7 22.4 X X 0.003 0.711 -0.023 0.123 -0.011
(0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006)
Comoros 1996 DHS 631 0.01% $625 43.9% 67.5% 1.27% 28.9 20.7 X X 0.011 0.346 0.888 -0.029 -1.589
(0.050) (0.076) (0.451) (0.031) (2.167)
Congo 2007 DHS 2,729 0.03% $240 74.8% 64.0% 1.12% 28.4 20.3 X X 0.023 0.396 -0.564 0.018 -0.529
(0.029) (0.066) (0.273) (0.022) (1.441)
Congo 2013 DHS 5,657 0.06% $260 77.1% 67.0% 1.07% 28.4 20.4 X X -0.012 0.310 -0.104 -0.007 0.257
(0.020) (0.049) (0.274) (0.014) (2.181)
Denmark 1787 NAPP 24,456 0.27% $1,274 2.5% 51.8% 0.53% 30.6 24.0 -0.015 0.492 0.010 0.012 0.431
(0.002) (0.020) (0.031) (0.006) (0.274)
Denmark 1801 NAPP 27,372 0.30% $1,274 1.9% 52.8% 0.53% 30.5 24.2 -0.015 0.455 0.018 0.015 -0.052
(0.002) (0.020) (0.030) (0.005) (0.114)
Dominican Repu 1981 PUMS-I: America 22,567 0.25% $2,368 28.2% 65.5% 3.23% 28.5 20.2 X -0.097 0.357 -0.013 0.013 0.809
(0.009) (0.010) (0.055) (0.007) (0.719)
El Salvador 1992 PUMS-I: America 27,018 0.30% $2,285 31.8% 56.7% 1.36% 28.8 19.9 X X -0.148 0.436 0.063 0.019 0.013
(0.006) (0.011) (0.058) (0.006) (0.297)
Ethiopia 2000 DHS 3,712 0.04% $562 57.1% 64.5% 0.25% 28.6 20.0 X X -0.070 0.449 0.069 0.004 -4.135
(0.028) (0.144) (0.483) (0.017) (17.700)
Ethiopia 2005 DHS 3,747 0.04% $672 25.5% 71.6% 0.45% 28.9 19.6 X X -0.115 0.372 0.160 -0.001 -3.379
(0.024) (0.054) (0.414) (0.016) (46.185)
Ethiopia 2007 IPUMS-I: Africa 73,510 0.81% $771 74.6% 69.6% 0.98% 28.6 19.3 X -0.009 0.341 0.049 0.004 -0.233
(0.004) (0.008) (0.047) (0.003) (0.789)
Ethiopia 2011 DHS 4,461 0.05% $935 37.1% 67.8% 0.93% 28.8 19.7 X X -0.045 0.238 0.324 0.007 -2.914
(0.028) (0.072) (0.540) (0.018) (7.536)
Germany 1819 NAPP 2,062 0.02% $986 3.7% 55.0% 0.72% 30.1 22.3 X -0.022 0.471 0.115 0.029 0.152
(0.015) (0.063) (0.184) (0.028) (0.406)
Ghana 1993 DHS 1,355 0.01% $1,133 85.4% 56.7% 1.18% 29.2 20.8 X X -0.033 0.459 -0.112 0.018 0.883
(0.022) (0.063) (0.199) (0.023) (1.539)
Ghana 1998 DHS 1,153 0.01% $1,282 86.5% 53.9% 1.33% 29.2 20.9 X X -0.010 0.451 0.140 0.006 -2.863
(0.023) (0.068) (0.142) (0.026) (13.515)
Ghana 2000 IPUMS-I: Africa 72,394 0.80% $1,353 86.7% 55.6% 2.98% 29.4 20.5 X 0.008 0.446 -0.002 0.003 -0.721
(0.003) (0.005) (0.017) (0.003) (1.364)
Ghana 2003 DHS 1,316 0.01% $1,471 90.4% 52.3% 0.91% 29.4 21.0 X X -0.023 0.437 -0.101 -0.035 0.463
(0.021) (0.089) (0.203) (0.026) (0.623)
Ghana 2008 DHS 1,043 0.01% $1,767 90.3% 49.9% 1.26% 29.5 21.2 X X -0.003 0.509 -0.238 0.005 -5.333
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(0.023) (0.071) (0.234) (0.030) (29.024)
Ghana 2010 IPUMS-I: Africa 99,670 1.10% $1,922 86.1% 55.6% 2.98% 29.4 20.8 X -0.008 0.434 -0.014 0.011 -0.147
(0.003) (0.004) (0.015) (0.003) (0.205)
Ghana 2014 DHS 2,053 0.02% $1,922 83.2% 52.1% 1.80% 29.5 21.4 X X -0.028 0.510 -0.195 0.020 0.117
(0.022) (0.049) (0.183) (0.023) (1.012)
Guinea 1983 IPUMS-I: Africa 20,684 0.23% $539 49.7% 52.3% 3.55% 28.8 20.2 X -0.030 0.456 -0.100 0.004 -2.530
(0.008) (0.008) (0.041) (0.006) (3.992)
Guinea 1996 IPUMS-I: Africa 37,807 0.42% $555 71.7% 61.9% 2.36% 28.7 20.1 X X 0.006 0.376 -0.094 0.000 -33.935
(0.005) (0.008) (0.042) (0.004) (2071.208)
Guinea 1999 DHS 2,027 0.02% $587 84.5% 62.2% 1.21% 29.0 20.0 X X 0.009 0.355 0.005 0.032 -0.733
(0.019) (0.051) (0.198) (0.018) (0.664)
Guinea 2005 DHS 2,243 0.02% $615 87.0% 60.7% 1.36% 29.2 20.2 X X 0.021 0.488 0.002 0.009 1.164
(0.019) (0.041) (0.128) (0.019) (3.017)
Haiti 1971 PUMS-I: America 18,141 0.20% $966 70.0% 58.6% 1.19% 29.3 21.2 X -0.045 0.449 -0.023 0.002 -8.420
(0.008) (0.016) (0.071) (0.007) (36.650)
Haiti 1982 PUMS-I: America 4,195 0.05% $1,171 55.0% 53.9% 1.74% 29.0 21.2 X -0.090 0.423 -0.087 0.003 0.429
(0.017) (0.029) (0.139) (0.014) (6.100)
Haiti 1994 DHS 1,051 0.01% $800 45.6% 60.3% 1.34% 29.3 21.4 X X -0.009 0.301 -0.297 0.029 -0.331
(0.036) (0.068) (0.403) (0.026) (1.101)
Haiti 2000 DHS 2,002 0.02% $746 55.2% 58.4% 0.43% 29.3 21.4 X X -0.104 0.577 -0.540 0.043 0.705
(0.044) (0.061) (0.212) (0.035) (1.185)
Haiti 2003 PUMS-I: America 29,838 0.33% $708 53.3% 55.1% 1.58% 29.3 20.7 X -0.045 0.444 -0.064 0.011 0.459
(0.006) (0.010) (0.052) (0.005) (0.556)
Haiti 2005 DHS 1,932 0.02% $690 54.1% 53.9% 0.61% 29.3 21.0 X X -0.048 0.498 0.007 0.009 -0.081
(0.032) (0.045) (0.292) (0.025) (2.981)
Honduras 2005 DHS 5,219 0.06% $2,113 39.4% 54.3% 0.43% 28.9 19.7 X X -0.146 0.522 -0.082 0.033 0.247
(0.018) (0.060) (0.177) (0.014) (0.506)
India 1983 IPUMS-I: Asia 41,910 0.46% $1,026 34.4% 61.6% 0.55% 28.8 19.9 X -0.019 0.378 -0.082 0.013 -0.297
(0.007) (0.027) (0.108) (0.005) (0.469)
India 1987 IPUMS-I: Asia 45,884 0.51% $1,166 33.9% 60.6% 0.55% 28.8 19.9 X -0.003 0.433 0.004 0.025 -0.792
(0.006) (0.017) (0.137) (0.005) (0.281)
India 1992 DHS 33,928 0.38% $1,377 32.7% 61.2% 0.36% 28.4 19.4 X X -0.025 0.425 -0.068 0.011 -0.172
(0.007) (0.021) (0.113) (0.006) (0.584)
India 1993 IPUMS-I: Asia 39,508 0.44% $1,430 39.5% 56.2% 0.43% 29.0 20.1 X -0.004 0.484 -0.143 0.027 -0.425
(0.007) (0.021) (0.095) (0.006) (0.244)
India 1998 DHS 34,272 0.38% $1,755 37.3% 56.9% 0.32% 28.5 19.3 X X -0.029 0.454 -0.063 0.025 0.385
(0.007) (0.021) (0.114) (0.006) (0.268)
India 1999 IPUMS-I: Asia 41,373 0.46% $1,819 38.4% 54.6% 0.44% 29.2 20.2 X 0.020 0.496 -0.023 0.037 0.027
(0.007) (0.020) (0.090) (0.006) (0.182)
India 2004 IPUMS-I: Asia 41,618 0.46% $2,315 42.3% 49.0% 0.35% 29.3 20.3 X -0.007 0.564 -0.087 0.027 0.103
(0.008) (0.022) (0.093) (0.007) (0.270)
India 2005 DHS 32,970 0.36% $2,457 37.8% 52.0% 0.45% 28.7 19.6 X X -0.006 0.518 0.012 0.032 -0.194
(0.008) (0.021) (0.095) (0.006) (0.210)
Indonesia 1971 IPUMS-I: Asia 37,598 0.42% $1,294 32.1% 67.4% 0.31% 28.9 19.8 X -0.057 0.318 0.159 -0.006 1.362
(0.012) (0.024) (0.193) (0.009) (2.917)
Indonesia 1976 IPUMS-I: Asia 16,776 0.19% $1,635 46.3% 66.2% 0.60% 28.9 19.9 X X -0.110 0.397 -0.277 0.011 -1.580
(0.012) (0.030) (0.166) (0.008) (1.410)
Indonesia 1980 IPUMS-I: Asia 436,461 4.83% $1,833 32.9% 62.3% 0.69% 28.5 19.8 X X -0.069 0.385 -0.089 0.010 0.159
(0.002) (0.004) (0.022) (0.001) (0.144)
Iraq 1997 IPUMS-I: Asia 106,406 1.18% $1,062 7.4% 72.1% 2.24% 28.6 21.2 X X -0.035 0.295 -0.047 0.010 0.179
(0.002) (0.005) (0.017) (0.002) (0.168)
Ivory Coast 1994 DHS 2,193 0.02% $1,312 78.4% 60.7% 0.88% 28.6 20.2 X X -0.004 0.438 -0.231 -0.004 9.724
(0.023) (0.072) (0.231) (0.018) (47.321)
Ivory Coast 1998 DHS 589 0.01% $1,377 85.1% 54.3% 1.30% 29.1 20.7 X X -0.043 0.280 0.246 -0.042 1.560
(0.036) (0.118) (0.215) (0.039) (1.613)
Ivory Coast 2011 DHS 2,500 0.03% $1,195 73.8% 52.4% 1.46% 28.8 20.8 X X 0.009 0.537 0.018 0.012 -1.681
(0.027) (0.048) (0.146) (0.021) (3.469)
Kenya 1989 IPUMS-I: Africa 61,498 0.68% $1,080 78.8% 70.4% 1.96% 28.0 19.4 X 0.012 0.295 0.085 0.000 12.790
(0.004) (0.007) (0.038) (0.003) (200.978)
Kenya 1993 DHS 2,362 0.03% $1,051 56.9% 69.8% 0.75% 28.5 19.6 X X 0.009 0.262 0.370 0.017 -0.480
(0.030) (0.060) (0.470) (0.018) (1.484)
Kenya 1998 DHS 2,229 0.02% $1,029 60.7% 61.1% 0.95% 28.6 19.9 X X -0.044 0.399 0.283 0.039 -0.537
(0.028) (0.071) (0.285) (0.020) (0.638)
Kenya 1999 IPUMS-I: Africa 79,020 0.87% $1,026 79.9% 61.6% 1.45% 28.4 19.6 X -0.021 0.391 0.093 0.008 -0.306
(0.003) (0.008) (0.028) (0.003) (0.372)
Kenya 2003 DHS 2,158 0.02% $1,032 65.7% 61.9% 1.26% 28.7 20.1 X X -0.065 0.486 -0.060 0.033 -1.319
(0.026) (0.048) (0.200) (0.020) (1.009)
Kenya 2008 DHS 2,350 0.03% $1,116 64.4% 60.7% 0.44% 28.6 19.9 X X -0.085 0.484 -0.137 0.006 -2.537
(0.032) (0.057) (0.263) (0.029) (11.309)
Kenya 2009 IPUMS-I: Africa 224,868 2.49% $1,121 78.8% 61.4% 1.46% 28.6 19.7 X -0.019 0.403 0.009 0.012 -0.174
(0.002) (0.004) (0.018) (0.002) (0.147)
Kenya 2014 DHS 4,289 0.05% $1,141 70.0% 56.9% 1.18% 28.9 19.9 X X -0.126 0.428 -0.058 0.029 0.657
(0.021) (0.041) (0.204) (0.019) (0.791)
Kyrgyz Republic 1999 IPUMS-I: Asia 29,660 0.33% $2,107 78.7% 52.7% 0.89% 29.3 21.2 X X 0.019 0.455 -0.050 0.061 -0.060
(0.005) (0.014) (0.057) (0.005) (0.078)
Lesotho 2004 DHS 1,296 0.01% $1,669 40.9% 46.2% 0.49% 28.9 20.1 X X -0.152 0.662 -0.551 -0.014 -0.296
(0.036) (0.074) (0.111) (0.028) (2.174)
Liberia 2007 DHS 1,715 0.02% $778 69.1% 49.5% 1.78% 28.8 20.8 X X 0.004 0.529 0.105 -0.007 1.196
(0.030) (0.064) (0.203) (0.027) (5.825)
Liberia 2008 IPUMS-I: Africa 14,661 0.16% $802 57.8% 56.7% 2.38% 28.6 19.9 X 0.023 0.429 -0.093 0.006 2.394
(0.009) (0.012) (0.063) (0.007) (3.077)
Madagascar 1992 DHS 1,575 0.02% $722 80.5% 65.8% 0.60% 28.6 20.2 X X -0.024 0.329 0.613 -0.038 0.872
(0.024) (0.057) (0.108) (0.022) (0.753)
Madagascar 1997 DHS 1,836 0.02% $676 82.0% 61.4% 0.61% 28.5 20.5 X X 0.048 0.215 -1.452 0.055 0.177
(0.023) (0.097) (1.025) (0.020) (0.342)
Madagascar 2003 DHS 2,066 0.02% $671 84.6% 59.2% 0.46% 28.7 20.5 X X 0.038 0.345 0.017 -0.021 -0.541
(0.027) (0.094) (0.275) (0.026) (1.240)
Madagascar 2008 DHS 4,664 0.05% $702 92.0% 62.5% 0.80% 28.8 20.1 X X 0.028 0.450 0.192 0.058 -0.132
(0.012) (0.047) (0.018) (0.015) (0.171)
Malawi 1987 IPUMS-I: Africa 42,881 0.47% $567 80.1% 58.0% 1.52% 28.3 20.3 X -0.035 0.394 -0.043 0.007 0.715
(0.004) (0.010) (0.041) (0.004) (0.713)
Malawi 1992 DHS 1,389 0.02% $536 26.2% 61.1% 1.02% 28.5 19.8 X X 0.069 0.426 0.038 0.049 0.007
(0.031) (0.064) (0.285) (0.025) (0.536)
Malawi 1998 IPUMS-I: Africa 51,847 0.57% $602 84.4% 56.4% 1.92% 28.1 19.9 X -0.008 0.407 -0.007 0.003 0.088
(0.004) (0.008) (0.028) (0.004) (1.020)
Malawi 2000 DHS 3,803 0.04% $598 59.6% 58.2% 0.94% 28.0 19.9 X X -0.057 0.483 -0.015 0.034 -0.379
(0.022) (0.039) (0.199) (0.015) (0.569)
Malawi 2004 DHS 3,989 0.04% $587 59.0% 57.8% 1.28% 27.8 19.7 X X 0.020 0.306 0.298 -0.029 0.899
(0.024) (0.062) (0.308) (0.015) (0.784)
Malawi 2008 IPUMS-I: Africa 87,562 0.97% $662 77.9% 60.1% 1.66% 28.1 19.7 X X -0.006 0.383 -0.042 0.005 0.644
(0.003) (0.007) (0.029) (0.003) (0.719)
Malawi 2010 DHS 8,215 0.09% $728 59.6% 62.8% 1.16% 28.2 19.6 X X -0.023 0.391 -0.138 0.021 -0.824
(0.018) (0.029) (0.173) (0.011) (0.790)
Malaysia 1970 IPUMS-I: Asia 9,724 0.11% $2,126 34.0% 73.2% 1.14% 28.9 20.4 X -0.059 0.243 -0.279 0.018 0.378
(0.012) (0.019) (0.179) (0.008) (0.571)
Mali 1987 IPUMS-I: Africa 40,230 0.45% $713 51.3% 63.7% 1.48% 28.6 20.2 X 0.002 0.349 -0.112 0.004 1.016
(0.006) (0.010) (0.059) (0.004) (1.455)
Mali 1995 DHS 3,161 0.03% $796 55.3% 69.2% 0.88% 28.9 20.1 X X 0.020 0.411 -0.126 0.001 -0.943
(0.024) (0.036) (0.241) (0.014) (28.507)
Mali 1998 IPUMS-I: Africa 49,792 0.55% $841 39.6% 67.5% 2.44% 28.7 20.0 X -0.003 0.292 -0.069 0.007 0.759
(0.005) (0.007) (0.048) (0.004) (0.727)
Mali 2001 DHS 4,067 0.04% $892 65.4% 66.4% 0.50% 28.8 20.1 X X -0.016 0.365 -0.377 -0.003 5.802
(0.024) (0.065) (0.307) (0.015) (29.939)
Mali 2006 DHS 4,623 0.05% $984 63.7% 67.0% 0.87% 28.3 19.7 X X -0.032 0.336 -0.264 0.009 -0.803
(0.024) (0.057) (0.256) (0.014) (2.640)
Mali 2009 IPUMS-I: Africa 75,084 0.83% $1,036 39.7% 69.3% 2.64% 28.5 19.9 X X 0.003 0.294 0.066 0.008 -0.419
(0.005) (0.005) (0.038) (0.003) (0.470)
Mali 2012 DHS 3,843 0.04% $1,059 45.5% 72.1% 0.86% 28.8 19.8 X X -0.065 0.332 -0.538 0.028 -0.984
(0.024) (0.042) (0.231) (0.014) (0.789)
Mongolia 2000 IPUMS-I: Asia 14,378 0.16% $1,055 79.3% 40.9% 0.62% 29.8 21.4 X X -0.015 0.543 -0.063 0.042 0.122
(0.007) (0.024) (0.083) (0.007) (0.162)
Morocco 1982 IPUMS-I: Africa 53,186 0.59% $2,261 11.7% 71.5% 1.68% 28.5 20.2 X -0.067 0.322 -0.073 0.005 -0.645
(0.004) (0.007) (0.031) (0.003) (0.727)
Mozambique 1997 IPUMS-I: Africa 82,358 0.91% $1,311 69.7% 56.6% 1.52% 28.3 19.9 X -0.012 0.413 -0.105 0.003 1.183
(0.004) (0.007) (0.033) (0.003) (1.517)
Mozambique 1997 DHS 2,320 0.03% $1,311 64.5% 54.9% 0.72% 28.3 19.8 X X 0.005 0.384 -0.241 -0.029 -0.051
(0.042) (0.081) (0.356) (0.036) (1.260)
Mozambique 2003 DHS 3,453 0.04% $1,849 78.9% 61.8% 1.19% 28.4 20.0 X X 0.005 0.409 0.039 0.010 -0.219
(0.021) (0.048) (0.185) (0.018) (1.700)
Mozambique 2007 IPUMS-I: Africa 121,872 1.35% $2,284 71.7% 63.2% 1.72% 28.3 19.8 X 0.041 0.348 -0.068 0.004 0.149
(0.003) (0.005) (0.029) (0.002) (0.725)
Nepal 1996 DHS 3,299 0.04% $928 79.2% 62.4% 0.26% 28.3 19.8 X X 0.016 0.525 -0.101 -0.007 2.083
(0.019) (0.064) (0.331) (0.015) (4.821)
Nepal 2001 DHS 3,511 0.04% $997 84.4% 60.4% 0.33% 28.5 19.9 X X 0.013 0.268 -0.904 0.031 0.317
(0.016) (0.056) (0.636) (0.015) (0.454)
Nepal 2006 DHS 3,251 0.04% $1,079 72.4% 51.4% 0.44% 28.3 19.7 X X 0.015 0.249 -1.217 0.010 1.096
(0.022) (0.084) (1.286) (0.018) (2.855)
Nicaragua 1995 PUMS-I: America 27,148 0.30% $1,332 34.9% 63.8% 1.97% 28.3 19.4 X X -0.128 0.361 -0.007 0.020 0.358
(0.007) (0.010) (0.057) (0.005) (0.305)
Nicaragua 1998 DHS 3,733 0.04% $1,445 39.4% 59.8% 0.61% 28.7 19.5 X X -0.103 0.385 0.051 0.017 0.398
(0.020) (0.040) (0.270) (0.016) (1.164)
Nicaragua 2001 DHS 3,278 0.04% $1,576 41.2% 56.9% 0.72% 28.9 19.4 X X -0.177 0.412 0.529 0.049 -0.238
(0.022) (0.040) (0.246) (0.018) (0.404)
Nicaragua 2005 PUMS-I: America 29,130 0.32% $1,644 33.9% 51.7% 1.54% 28.6 19.2 X X -0.117 0.469 0.039 0.026 -0.114
(0.006) (0.010) (0.049) (0.005) (0.212)
Niger 1992 DHS 2,049 0.02% $511 45.1% 64.8% 0.49% 28.2 19.6 X X -0.059 0.576 -0.202 0.012 2.766
(0.030) (0.065) (0.296) (0.020) (5.303)
Niger 1998 DHS 2,304 0.03% $455 54.6% 65.5% 0.61% 28.7 20.0 X X -0.054 0.362 -0.253 -0.035 -0.855
(0.028) (0.079) (0.419) (0.017) (0.732)
Niger 2006 DHS 3,095 0.03% $491 39.4% 67.8% 0.58% 28.4 19.9 X X -0.051 0.330 0.246 -0.020 -0.017
(0.027) (0.093) (0.397) (0.016) (1.048)
Niger 2012 DHS 4,520 0.05% $519 23.7% 74.6% 0.88% 28.6 20.0 X X -0.070 0.195 0.051 0.013 -2.349
(0.019) (0.050) (0.422) (0.012) (2.259)
Nigeria 1990 DHS 2,644 0.03% $1,057 70.8% 66.7% 0.69% 28.8 20.3 X X 0.037 0.462 0.492 0.049 -0.344
(0.028) (0.064) (0.126) (0.022) (0.490)
Nigeria 2003 DHS 1,814 0.02% $1,350 66.3% 65.1% 0.84% 28.7 20.4 X X -0.003 0.479 -0.822 -0.004 0.291
(0.036) (0.084) (0.296) (0.023) (7.002)
Nigeria 2006 IPUMS-I: Africa 4,789 0.05% $1,595 46.4% 59.5% 1.83% 29.1 20.2 X -0.043 0.460 -0.142 0.017 -1.771
(0.018) (0.025) (0.134) (0.015) (1.795)
Nigeria 2007 IPUMS-I: Africa 4,248 0.05% $1,664 51.6% 63.1% 1.91% 29.3 20.4 X -0.058 0.442 -0.146 0.010 -4.711
(0.023) (0.025) (0.157) (0.021) (9.716)
Nigeria 2008 IPUMS-I: Africa 5,971 0.07% $1,723 56.8% 65.6% 2.22% 29.1 20.2 X -0.011 0.417 -0.164 0.013 -3.923
(0.018) (0.029) (0.145) (0.014) (4.459)
Nigeria 2008 DHS 9,291 0.10% $1,723 68.7% 65.0% 1.09% 28.9 20.7 X X -0.028 0.345 0.029 0.002 -1.680
(0.013) (0.026) (0.136) (0.009) (7.641)
Nigeria 2009 IPUMS-I: Africa 3,151 0.03% $1,790 47.0% 65.6% 1.44% 29.0 19.9 X -0.024 0.353 -0.355 0.016 -0.253
(0.025) (0.042) (0.254) (0.020) (1.416)
Nigeria 2010 IPUMS-I: Africa 4,028 0.04% $1,876 59.0% 61.8% 1.67% 29.4 20.1 X X -0.051 0.370 0.078 -0.007 6.533
(0.020) (0.031) (0.171) (0.016) (16.018)
Nigeria 2013 DHS 10,597 0.12% $1,876 71.3% 67.7% 0.84% 28.9 20.5 X X 0.004 0.379 -0.086 -0.003 3.479
(0.013) (0.030) (0.150) (0.009) (9.908)
Norway 1801 NAPP 25,820 0.29% $801 2.1% 56.2% 0.54% 30.4 23.7 -0.019 0.443 0.065 0.004 -0.497
(0.002) (0.022) (0.042) (0.005) (0.804)
Norway 1865 NAPP 53,059 0.59% $1,269 1.2% 60.2% 0.60% 30.5 23.7 -0.011 0.396 0.001 0.003 0.318
(0.001) (0.015) (0.016) (0.004) (0.490)
Norway 1875 NAPP 17,956 0.20% $1,520 3.4% 58.8% 0.68% 30.2 23.4 -0.039 0.238 -0.160 -0.002 2.372
(0.014) (0.084) (0.079) (0.021) (23.956)
Norway 1900 NAPP 68,771 0.76% $1,880 11.5% 62.8% 0.71% 30.2 23.4 -0.041 0.361 -0.012 0.004 1.405
(0.003) (0.011) (0.040) (0.003) (1.265)
Norway 1910 NAPP 75,194 0.83% $2,210 9.2% 64.8% 0.90% 30.2 23.0 X -0.037 0.347 -0.009 0.009 0.257
(0.003) (0.010) (0.032) (0.003) (0.257)
Pakistan 1973 IPUMS-I: Asia 76,747 0.85% $957 5.1% 68.0% 1.25% 29.4 20.4 X -0.009 0.340 -0.016 0.005 -0.278
(0.002) (0.008) (0.022) (0.003) (0.446)
Pakistan 1990 DHS 2,757 0.03% $1,601 16.5% 76.2% 1.08% 28.9 20.2 X X -0.041 0.241 -0.397 0.003 -6.146
(0.025) (0.047) (0.191) (0.018) (43.031)
Pakistan 2006 DHS 3,698 0.04% $2,266 25.0% 70.3% 0.74% 29.1 20.7 X X 0.023 0.284 -0.821 0.018 0.118
(0.021) (0.042) (0.179) (0.015) (0.896)
Pakistan 2012 DHS 5,043 0.06% $2,494 27.2% 66.7% 0.78% 29.2 21.1 X X -0.021 0.289 0.164 0.032 0.613
(0.023) (0.061) (0.391) (0.015) (0.644)
Panama 1960 PUMS-I: America 2,780 0.03% $2,484 18.1% 71.3% 1.26% 28.3 20.0 X -0.149 0.315 -0.061 0.005 2.901
(0.020) (0.033) (0.201) (0.016) (9.949)
Paraguay 1962 PUMS-I: America 4,420 0.05% $1,638 20.1% 71.7% 1.27% 28.8 20.6 X -0.133 0.317 0.115 0.010 2.751
(0.016) (0.024) (0.178) (0.012) (3.755)
Paraguay 1972 PUMS-I: America 11,299 0.13% $1,990 16.0% 69.2% 0.90% 28.8 20.6 X -0.120 0.301 -0.065 0.010 0.317
(0.009) (0.021) (0.114) (0.008) (0.745)
Philippines 1990 IPUMS-I: Asia 347,726 3.85% $2,120 30.3% 64.5% 1.31% 29.1 21.2 X -0.072 0.342 0.056 0.026 -0.087
(0.002) (0.003) (0.021) (0.001) (0.060)
Philippines 1993 DHS 3,732 0.04% $2,162 37.5% 63.0% 0.51% 29.2 21.3 X X -0.103 0.315 -0.343 0.029 0.129
(0.019) (0.059) (0.390) (0.014) (0.569)
Philippines 1998 DHS 3,290 0.04% $2,290 41.5% 62.2% 0.82% 29.6 21.7 X X -0.092 0.383 -0.084 0.027 -0.684
(0.022) (0.056) (0.289) (0.017) (0.763)
Philippines 2003 DHS 3,001 0.03% $2,486 42.7% 55.8% 0.65% 29.6 21.6 X X -0.068 0.475 0.021 0.030 -0.569
(0.022) (0.061) (0.238) (0.016) (0.683)
Rwanda 1991 IPUMS-I: Africa 42,005 0.46% $800 97.3% 68.0% 1.72% 29.5 21.4 X 0.002 0.276 -0.047 0.002 -0.049
(0.002) (0.010) (0.026) (0.004) (0.791)
Rwanda 1992 DHS 1,710 0.02% $770 98.0% 64.1% 0.61% 29.6 21.8 X X -0.004 0.284 -0.051 0.013 0.169
(0.007) (0.084) (0.119) (0.019) (0.496)
Rwanda 2000 DHS 2,294 0.03% $743 87.6% 57.3% 0.32% 29.2 21.8 X X 0.003 0.398 -0.611 -0.004 -2.698
(0.018) (0.079) (0.381) (0.018) (12.795)
Rwanda 2002 IPUMS-I: Africa 41,817 0.46% $794 92.6% 56.6% 1.43% 29.0 21.6 X X -0.011 0.434 -0.083 0.005 -1.176
(0.003) (0.010) (0.029) (0.004) (1.174)
Rwanda 2005 DHS 2,668 0.03% $884 71.9% 60.9% 0.69% 29.2 21.9 X X 0.009 0.330 -0.021 -0.014 2.024
(0.023) (0.049) (0.355) (0.017) (2.789)
Saotome 2008 DHS 813 0.01% $1,484 57.1% 58.6% 2.42% 28.8 20.0 X X 0.032 0.432 0.477 0.036 -1.245
(0.052) (0.079) (0.236) (0.037) (1.751)
Senegal 1988 IPUMS-I: Africa 39,875 0.44% $1,267 22.7% 67.8% 2.04% 28.1 19.7 X -0.020 0.295 -0.017 0.005 0.136
(0.005) (0.008) (0.050) (0.004) (0.782)
Senegal 1992 DHS 1,814 0.02% $1,229 46.6% 68.1% 0.66% 28.8 19.8 X X -0.027 0.277 -0.207 -0.002 -3.470
(0.029) (0.083) (0.512) (0.019) (38.196)
Senegal 1997 DHS 2,320 0.03% $1,245 61.9% 63.4% 0.53% 28.8 20.2 X X 0.062 0.320 -0.283 0.019 -0.533
(0.030) (0.069) (0.575) (0.019) (1.363)
Senegal 2002 IPUMS-I: Africa 41,222 0.46% $1,359 29.2% 65.2% 2.67% 28.9 19.9 X -0.009 0.352 0.013 0.001 -1.602
(0.005) (0.007) (0.039) (0.004) (15.525)
Senegal 2005 DHS 3,522 0.04% $1,424 37.2% 61.4% 1.00% 28.9 20.6 X X -0.041 0.441 0.091 0.015 -1.997
(0.024) (0.039) (0.211) (0.017) (2.509)
Senegal 2010 DHS 4,104 0.05% $1,507 38.8% 63.5% 1.28% 28.8 20.6 X X -0.041 0.400 0.280 0.005 1.577
(0.024) (0.041) (0.228) (0.017) (6.702)
Senegal 2014 DHS 2,320 0.03% $1,507 47.2% 61.1% 1.27% 28.6 20.7 X X -0.048 0.371 -0.038 -0.043 -0.309
(0.034) (0.058) (0.302) (0.022) (0.638)
Sierra Leone 2004 IPUMS-I: Africa 18,744 0.21% $587 70.3% 58.5% 3.93% 29.2 20.3 X -0.002 0.436 0.052 0.005 -1.015
(0.007) (0.008) (0.039) (0.007) (1.862)
Sierra Leone 2008 DHS 1,973 0.02% $686 80.8% 52.9% 1.17% 29.1 20.5 X X 0.001 0.515 0.109 0.037 0.674
(0.022) (0.052) (0.144) (0.023) (0.683)
Sweden 1880 NAPP 139,113 1.54% $1,503 1.9% 56.8% 0.66% 30.4 23.8 -0.026 0.407 0.003 0.009 0.113
(0.001) (0.008) (0.012) (0.002) (0.086)
Sweden 1890 NAPP 152,922 1.69% $1,647 3.3% 59.6% 0.61% 30.4 23.6 -0.039 0.399 0.006 0.010 0.000
(0.001) (0.008) (0.015) (0.002) (0.089)
Sweden 1900 NAPP 149,091 1.65% $2,087 2.8% 59.3% 0.63% 30.3 23.5 -0.028 0.413 0.013 0.012 0.007
(0.001) (0.008) (0.014) (0.002) (0.069)
Tajikistan 2012 DHS 2,389 0.03% $1,661 24.5% 56.1% 0.61% 28.8 21.4 X X -0.057 0.279 0.682 0.029 0.360
(0.025) (0.087) (0.653) (0.018) (0.735)
Tanzania 1988 IPUMS-I: Africa 112,710 1.25% $540 88.7% 63.4% 2.46% 28.5 19.8 X 0.006 0.355 0.036 -0.007 -0.293
(0.002) (0.005) (0.018) (0.003) (0.335)
Tanzania 1991 DHS 2,468 0.03% $536 73.2% 61.9% 0.84% 28.2 20.0 X X -0.018 0.460 -0.427 0.027 1.206
(0.027) (0.053) (0.290) (0.020) (1.262)
Tanzania 1996 DHS 2,249 0.02% $525 57.8% 61.9% 0.76% 28.6 20.3 X X 0.032 0.397 0.141 0.000 -88.352
(0.026) (0.065) (0.308) (0.019) (11917.960)
Tanzania 1999 DHS 1,069 0.01% $546 78.2% 59.0% 1.80% 28.5 20.2 X X 0.021 0.499 0.221 0.001 35.771
(0.044) (0.067) (0.136) (0.034) (1084.818)
Tanzania 2002 IPUMS-I: Africa 191,556 2.12% $591 78.5% 60.8% 2.37% 28.6 20.0 X 0.033 0.385 -0.025 0.001 1.121
(0.003) (0.005) (0.022) (0.002) (5.130)
Tanzania 2004 DHS 2,914 0.03% $637 86.1% 59.8% 1.64% 28.6 20.3 X X 0.057 0.284 0.035 0.007 -0.839
(0.019) (0.056) (0.239) (0.018) (3.212)
Tanzania 2010 DHS 2,708 0.03% $804 86.7% 61.0% 0.82% 28.7 20.3 X X 0.032 0.476 0.041 0.010 -0.500
(0.018) (0.051) (0.152) (0.020) (1.874)
Togo 1998 DHS 2,461 0.03% $661 87.1% 62.3% 2.04% 29.3 20.9 X X 0.021 0.436 -0.065 -0.002 -7.846
(0.018) (0.044) (0.142) (0.018) (85.737)
USA 1860 IPUMS-USA 14,364 0.16% $2,219 5.0% 63.7% 0.66% 28.9 21.1 -0.011 0.322 0.129 0.023 0.101
(0.004) (0.023) (0.092) (0.007) (0.162)
USA 1870 IPUMS-USA 18,167 0.20% $2,497 5.2% 61.5% 0.81% 29.1 21.0 -0.023 0.360 0.114 0.008 -0.441
(0.004) (0.020) (0.066) (0.006) (0.539)
Uganda 1991 IPUMS-I: Africa 84,404 0.93% $584 72.7% 66.1% 1.81% 28.0 19.7 X 0.005 0.328 -0.023 -0.001 0.430
(0.004) (0.007) (0.040) (0.003) (4.401)
Uganda 1995 DHS 2,144 0.02% $654 65.0% 67.4% 0.75% 28.1 19.9 X X 0.045 0.331 -0.219 -0.019 1.322
(0.030) (0.062) (0.387) (0.019) (1.726)
Uganda 2000 DHS 2,236 0.02% $780 79.8% 69.3% 0.55% 27.8 19.7 X X 0.012 0.388 -0.077 -0.007 -1.956
(0.026) (0.055) (0.318) (0.018) (5.519)
Uganda 2002 IPUMS-I: Africa 136,380 1.51% $835 58.2% 69.8% 2.55% 28.0 19.5 X X -0.017 0.277 0.023 0.000 -11.084
(0.003) (0.004) (0.030) (0.002) (147.754)
Uganda 2006 DHS 2,685 0.03% $989 88.9% 68.5% 0.97% 28.3 19.9 X X 0.025 0.301 -0.117 0.039 -0.078
(0.017) (0.059) (0.262) (0.016) (0.331)
Uganda 2011 DHS 2,593 0.03% $1,158 75.8% 66.1% 1.13% 28.2 20.0 X X -0.037 0.348 -0.143 0.013 2.092
(0.025) (0.048) (0.267) (0.018) (3.278)
Vietnam 1989 IPUMS-I: Asia 166,529 1.84% $1,009 87.9% 55.4% 1.06% 29.4 21.8 X X -0.008 0.406 -0.068 0.029 -0.105
(0.002) (0.008) (0.027) (0.003) (0.067)
Vietnam 1997 DHS 1,910 0.02% $1,560 92.0% 43.1% 0.57% 30.1 21.6 X X 0.004 0.635 -0.120 0.087 -0.070
(0.015) (0.082) (0.203) (0.022) (0.153)
Vietnam 1999 IPUMS-I: Asia 133,016 1.47% $1,739 85.3% 37.6% 0.61% 30.0 21.4 X X 0.003 0.620 -0.079 0.068 -0.029
(0.003) (0.011) (0.029) (0.003) (0.036)
Vietnam 2002 DHS 1,634 0.02% $2,039 93.1% 28.5% 0.22% 30.3 21.2 X X -0.030 0.628 0.063 0.129 -0.164
(0.015) (0.094) (0.021) (0.023) (0.106)
Yemen 1991 DHS 1,505 0.02% $2,380 12.1% 78.6% 0.87% 28.7 20.1 X X -0.031 0.200 -0.278 0.004 1.325
(0.024) (0.057) (0.303) (0.019) (7.594)
Zambia 1990 IPUMS-I: Africa 33,408 0.37% $772 27.8% 69.4% 2.25% 28.3 19.1 X -0.043 0.298 0.007 -0.004 -0.432
(0.006) (0.009) (0.056) (0.004) (1.189)
Zambia 1992 DHS 1,963 0.02% $730 59.1% 65.7% 0.70% 28.2 19.5 X X -0.089 0.288 -0.246 0.007 2.960
(0.029) (0.067) (0.425) (0.018) (9.012)
Zambia 1996 DHS 2,302 0.03% $635 53.2% 62.9% 0.78% 28.1 19.7 X X -0.093 0.534 -0.051 -0.014 0.227
(0.026) (0.046) (0.227) (0.018) (1.601)
Zambia 2001 DHS 2,288 0.03% $616 60.8% 62.1% 0.58% 28.1 19.6 X X -0.054 0.451 -0.011 -0.001 12.981
(0.027) (0.066) (0.311) (0.018) (309.046)
Zambia 2007 DHS 2,267 0.03% $716 52.6% 64.5% 1.41% 28.3 19.9 X X -0.048 0.394 0.056 -0.002 -0.931
(0.028) (0.052) (0.253) (0.018) (11.688)
Zambia 2010 IPUMS-I: Africa 78,308 0.87% $795 52.8% 66.8% 1.78% 28.3 19.4 X 0.017 0.321 0.068 -0.002 1.337
(0.004) (0.006) (0.042) (0.003) (2.727)
Zambia 2013 DHS 5,091 0.06% $795 57.0% 65.0% 0.99% 28.6 19.8 X X 0.041 0.432 -0.006 -0.002 6.480
(0.021) (0.045) (0.183) (0.013) (49.240)
Zimbabwe 1994 DHS 1,467 0.02% $1,341 59.8% 59.1% 1.13% 28.9 20.1 X X -0.058 0.422 -0.547 0.035 0.622
(0.034) (0.074) (0.383) (0.022) (0.875)
Zimbabwe 1999 DHS 1,240 0.01% $1,311 57.1% 47.5% 0.31% 28.7 20.2 X X -0.011 0.561 0.260 0.022 1.779
(0.038) (0.141) (0.354) (0.025) (2.443)
Zimbabwe 2005 DHS 2,135 0.02% $872 37.4% 44.6% 1.00% 28.8 20.2 X X -0.120 0.631 0.009 -0.007 -5.259
(0.027) (0.064) (0.184) (0.022) (16.944)
Zimbabwe 2010 DHS 2,246 0.02% $750 38.1% 40.6% 1.00% 28.9 20.3 X X -0.117 0.600 -0.244 0.006 -1.728
(0.026) (0.060) (0.167) (0.019) (6.744)
Country
Year 
(#Samples)
Source N
Percent of 
Pooled
Mean GDP/C In Labor Force
3 or More 
Children
2nd Child is 
Multiple Birth
Mother's Age 
at Survey
Mother's Age 
at First Birth
Education?
Month/Quarter 
of Birth?
OLS FS, Twin IV 2S, Twin IV FS, Same-Sex 2S, Same-Sex
Pooled 101 10,087,488 $3,656 28.5% 54.2% 0.96% 29.6 21.1 -0.049 0.448 -0.007 0.024 -0.013
(0.008) (0.035) (0.012) (0.006) (0.013)
Albania 2008 DHS 1,223 0.01% $4,916 27.4% 34.5% 0.39% 30.7 21.5 X X -0.180 0.674 0.286 0.144 -0.047
(0.034) (0.064) (0.269) (0.029) (0.211)
Armenia 2000 DHS 1,500 0.01% $4,912 30.0% 32.8% 0.44% 29.3 20.6 X X -0.014 0.753 -0.120 0.083 -0.509
(0.029) (0.063) (0.189) (0.023) (0.327)
Bolivia 1976 PUMS-I: America 25,165 0.25% $2,571 17.5% 61.9% 0.58% 28.8 20.8 X -0.076 0.369 -0.049 0.014 -0.008
(0.006) (0.021) (0.082) (0.005) (0.337)
Bolivia 1998 DHS 2,850 0.03% $2,510 52.8% 58.1% 0.42% 29.1 20.5 X X -0.152 0.373 0.130 0.038 -0.184
(0.024) (0.062) (0.417) (0.019) (0.553)
Bolivia 2001 PUMS-I: America 38,755 0.38% $2,566 41.9% 56.1% 0.87% 29.1 20.4 X -0.097 0.451 -0.022 0.013 0.050
(0.006) (0.012) (0.059) (0.005) (0.392)
Bolivia 2003 DHS 4,441 0.04% $2,611 60.3% 56.5% 0.28% 29.1 20.3 X X -0.066 0.358 0.255 0.021 -0.086
(0.020) (0.046) (0.280) (0.017) (0.882)
Bolivia 2008 DHS 3,943 0.04% $2,920 64.8% 52.3% 0.48% 29.2 20.3 X X -0.056 0.397 -0.083 0.059 0.037
(0.021) (0.045) (0.349) (0.017) (0.310)
Brazil 1970 PUMS-I: America 255,612 2.53% $3,124 11.4% 68.5% 1.93% 28.8 20.7 X -0.059 0.305 -0.061 0.021 -0.067
(0.002) (0.003) (0.014) (0.002) (0.062)
Brazil 1980 PUMS-I: America 312,368 3.10% $4,777 21.5% 59.0% 1.96% 28.9 21.0 X -0.080 0.372 -0.063 0.025 -0.008
(0.002) (0.003) (0.014) (0.002) (0.060)
Canada 1911 NAPP 13,428 0.13% $4,079 3.2% 62.1% 0.72% 29.5 22.2 X -0.006 0.360 -0.063 0.008 0.111
(0.004) (0.023) (0.029) (0.007) (0.381)
Colombia 1973 PUMS-I: America 97,406 0.97% $3,442 14.3% 70.0% 1.47% 28.7 20.1 X -0.095 0.300 0.050 0.017 0.109
(0.003) (0.006) (0.032) (0.003) (0.133)
Colombia 1985 PUMS-I: America 144,601 1.43% $4,366 33.5% 53.7% 1.93% 28.8 20.4 X -0.084 0.420 -0.010 0.035 -0.030
(0.003) (0.004) (0.022) (0.002) (0.072)
Colombia 1990 DHS 1,922 0.02% $4,817 35.7% 50.1% 0.88% 29.1 20.6 X X -0.106 0.504 0.492 0.039 -0.019
(0.030) (0.065) (0.330) (0.028) (0.717)
Costa Rica 1973 PUMS-I: America 9,714 0.10% $4,202 12.9% 69.3% 0.80% 28.6 20.2 X -0.103 0.323 0.026 -0.004 1.337
(0.009) (0.025) (0.118) (0.008) (3.429)
Costa Rica 1984 PUMS-I: America 15,379 0.15% $4,413 18.4% 53.6% 1.22% 28.7 20.3 X -0.086 0.484 0.072 0.043 0.026
(0.007) (0.017) (0.062) (0.007) (0.144)
Cuba 2002 PUMS-I: America 36,099 0.36% $2,583 35.5% 17.0% 1.00% 30.7 20.5 X -0.096 0.828 0.006 0.033 -0.002
(0.006) (0.005) (0.030) (0.004) (0.149)
Dominican Repu 2002 PUMS-I: America 42,518 0.42% $3,803 66.6% 53.0% 2.70% 29.2 20.3 X X -0.038 0.445 -0.031 0.031 -0.271
(0.005) (0.006) (0.032) (0.004) (0.152)
Dominican Repu 1991 DHS 1,762 0.02% $2,602 40.7% 58.8% 1.21% 28.9 20.7 X X -0.036 0.494 -0.517 0.046 -0.419
(0.037) (0.062) (0.229) (0.029) (0.739)
Dominican Repu 1996 DHS 2,107 0.02% $3,120 37.9% 55.6% 0.93% 28.9 20.7 X X -0.081 0.455 -0.057 0.088 -0.128
(0.027) (0.072) (0.328) (0.023) (0.279)
Dominican Repu 1999 DHS 314 0.00% $3,522 46.3% 50.1% 1.15% 29.3 21.0 X X -0.062 0.510 -0.350 -0.036 -1.168
(0.075) (0.151) (0.524) (0.056) (2.517)
Dominican Repu 2002 DHS 5,718 0.06% $3,803 38.5% 51.9% 0.76% 29.1 20.3 X X -0.104 0.500 0.168 0.026 -0.512
(0.019) (0.032) (0.179) (0.017) (0.723)
Dominican Repu 2007 DHS 5,876 0.06% $4,649 42.1% 52.2% 0.90% 29.3 20.0 X X -0.061 0.470 -0.124 0.023 0.304
(0.021) (0.031) (0.218) (0.018) (0.894)
Ecuador 1974 PUMS-I: America 32,604 0.32% $3,234 11.2% 68.5% 0.82% 28.6 20.4 X -0.070 0.296 -0.004 0.011 0.368
(0.005) (0.018) (0.073) (0.005) (0.424)
Ecuador 1982 PUMS-I: America 44,110 0.44% $4,025 15.8% 63.1% 0.97% 28.6 20.4 X -0.101 0.388 0.071 0.015 0.219
(0.004) (0.011) (0.049) (0.004) (0.248)
Ecuador 1990 PUMS-I: America 52,893 0.52% $3,941 25.7% 57.0% 0.91% 29.0 20.4 X -0.102 0.425 -0.019 0.027 0.113
(0.004) (0.011) (0.046) (0.004) (0.145)
Ecuador 2001 PUMS-I: America 56,918 0.56% $4,081 31.3% 48.8% 1.15% 29.1 20.2 X -0.088 0.540 -0.051 0.026 -0.073
(0.004) (0.008) (0.032) (0.004) (0.151)
Egypt 1992 DHS 3,869 0.04% $2,563 21.4% 69.3% 0.99% 29.1 20.5 X X -0.027 0.276 -0.034 0.028 -0.583
(0.019) (0.045) (0.264) (0.014) (0.576)
Egypt 1995 DHS 5,599 0.06% $2,726 18.5% 65.3% 0.77% 29.2 20.6 X X -0.048 0.367 0.402 0.034 -0.458
(0.016) (0.048) (0.211) (0.013) (0.392)
Egypt 1996 IPUMS-I: Africa 372,603 3.69% $2,819 14.6% 63.5% 1.41% 29.6 20.7 X -0.063 0.361 -0.019 0.040 0.007
(0.002) (0.004) (0.013) (0.001) (0.028)
Egypt 2000 DHS 5,707 0.06% $3,193 14.9% 60.8% 1.04% 29.3 20.9 X X -0.026 0.426 0.151 0.029 0.406
(0.013) (0.039) (0.133) (0.011) (0.388)
Egypt 2003 DHS 3,256 0.03% $3,409 19.0% 56.0% 0.67% 29.1 20.9 X X -0.032 0.480 -0.196 0.062 -0.219
(0.020) (0.045) (0.173) (0.016) (0.263)
Egypt 2005 DHS 6,910 0.07% $3,599 18.0% 55.0% 1.30% 29.0 21.1 X X 0.000 0.536 -0.044 0.084 0.085
(0.013) (0.034) (0.084) (0.011) (0.127)
Egypt 2006 IPUMS-I: Africa 439,867 4.36% $3,714 13.6% 52.5% 1.46% 29.3 20.8 X -0.022 0.475 0.006 0.048 0.025
(0.001) (0.003) (0.009) (0.001) (0.021)
Egypt 2008 DHS 5,814 0.06% $3,992 12.6% 52.7% 1.21% 29.1 21.1 X X -0.022 0.473 0.020 0.042 0.070
(0.012) (0.038) (0.093) (0.012) (0.223)
Egypt 2014 DHS 8,447 0.08% $4,267 13.2% 52.3% 1.22% 29.2 21.4 X X -0.012 0.442 0.062 0.038 -0.189
(0.011) (0.030) (0.104) (0.010) (0.233)
El Salvador 2007 PUMS-I: America 29,636 0.29% $2,897 41.5% 46.0% 1.94% 29.4 19.8 X X -0.111 0.515 -0.068 0.023 0.156
(0.006) (0.009) (0.040) (0.005) (0.254)
Gabon 2000 DHS 1,348 0.01% $4,174 43.8% 56.8% 1.60% 28.5 19.7 X X -0.017 0.463 0.016 -0.016 -3.966
(0.035) (0.050) (0.259) (0.028) (6.963)
Great Britain 1851 NAPP 11,693 0.12% $2,561 30.3% 64.9% 0.51% 30.4 22.5 -0.066 0.391 -0.112 0.015 0.228
(0.011) (0.027) (0.151) (0.008) (0.616)
Great Britain 1881 NAPP 972,869 9.64% $3,530 28.0% 68.8% 0.47% 30.1 22.2 -0.068 0.325 0.006 0.005 0.053
(0.001) (0.003) (0.021) (0.001) (0.180)
Great Britain 1911 NAPP 938,191 9.30% $4,699 8.9% 58.2% 0.71% 30.8 22.8 -0.044 0.432 -0.026 0.012 0.007
(0.001) (0.003) (0.008) (0.001) (0.048)
Guatemala 1995 DHS 3,639 0.04% $3,559 28.5% 67.6% 0.62% 28.6 19.8 X X -0.175 0.211 -0.187 -0.001 7.493
(0.027) (0.061) (0.732) (0.018) (138.931)
Guatemala 1998 DHS 1,787 0.02% $3,760 31.6% 66.7% 0.58% 28.6 20.0 X X -0.122 0.418 0.387 0.071 -0.287
(0.043) (0.042) (0.644) (0.032) (0.478)
Indonesia 1990 IPUMS-I: Asia 57,518 0.57% $2,543 42.1% 52.8% 0.63% 29.3 20.1 X X -0.075 0.464 -0.109 0.025 0.121
(0.005) (0.012) (0.056) (0.004) (0.173)
Indonesia 1991 DHS 8,118 0.08% $2,690 40.5% 52.3% 0.47% 29.3 19.9 X X -0.058 0.512 -0.274 0.001 5.007
(0.017) (0.051) (0.167) (0.014) (48.325)
Indonesia 1995 IPUMS-I: Asia 41,916 0.42% $3,256 42.7% 45.2% 0.50% 29.9 20.3 X X -0.064 0.538 -0.058 0.028 -0.078
(0.007) (0.016) (0.073) (0.005) (0.208)
Indonesia 2002 DHS 8,192 0.08% $3,429 43.8% 35.2% 0.34% 30.0 20.6 X X -0.052 0.688 -0.079 -0.001 2.362
(0.020) (0.034) (0.172) (0.017) (44.533)
Indonesia 2007 DHS 8,920 0.09% $4,161 50.6% 32.1% 0.51% 30.3 20.9 X X -0.052 0.704 0.132 0.046 -0.473
(0.018) (0.024) (0.143) (0.015) (0.388)
Indonesia 2010 IPUMS-I: Asia 1,055,321 10.46% $4,722 55.5% 29.8% 0.73% 30.5 21.0 X X -0.032 0.705 -0.037 0.030 -0.072
(0.001) (0.002) (0.008) (0.001) (0.032)
Indonesia 2012 DHS 8,276 0.08% $4,722 51.9% 26.4% 0.49% 30.6 21.2 X X -0.049 0.729 0.117 0.027 0.241
(0.018) (0.022) (0.145) (0.013) (0.606)
Jamaica 1982 PUMS-I: America 9,385 0.09% $3,167 51.7% 57.5% 2.16% 28.3 19.5 X -0.157 0.439 -0.013 0.006 -0.713
(0.011) (0.015) (0.081) (0.009) (2.037)
Jamaica 1991 PUMS-I: America 11,693 0.12% $3,731 44.3% 51.2% 2.30% 28.9 19.7 X X -0.150 0.504 0.003 0.001 -1.729
(0.010) (0.013) (0.061) (0.008) (25.555)
Jamaica 2001 PUMS-I: America 9,267 0.09% $3,700 52.8% 48.4% 2.06% 29.4 19.8 X X -0.125 0.513 0.014 0.011 0.581
(0.011) (0.016) (0.072) (0.010) (1.143)
Jordan 1990 DHS 2,767 0.03% $4,080 10.3% 80.6% 0.55% 28.6 20.4 X X 0.006 0.231 -0.406 0.046 -0.232
(0.020) (0.061) (0.192) (0.013) (0.261)
Jordan 1997 DHS 2,490 0.02% $4,039 10.8% 72.2% 1.05% 29.0 21.5 X X -0.023 0.265 0.634 -0.014 0.805
(0.018) (0.052) (0.342) (0.016) (1.271)
Jordan 2002 DHS 2,559 0.03% $4,504 7.8% 73.6% 0.98% 29.5 21.5 X X -0.016 0.327 0.370 0.045 0.279
(0.018) (0.048) (0.427) (0.017) (0.294)
Jordan 2004 IPUMS-I: Asia 28,275 0.28% $4,799 16.5% 69.8% 1.38% 29.5 21.6 X X -0.062 0.325 0.000 0.019 0.007
(0.006) (0.014) (0.058) (0.004) (0.230)
Kyrgyz Republic 2012 DHS 2,070 0.02% $2,947 21.7% 49.9% 0.74% 29.3 21.6 X X -0.210 0.474 -0.096 -0.002 10.091
(0.027) (0.062) (0.278) (0.022) (144.625)
Kyrgyz Republic 2009 IPUMS-I: Asia 30,670 0.30% $2,976 66.3% 49.6% 0.91% 29.4 21.1 X X -0.029 0.517 -0.031 0.052 -0.088
(0.006) (0.015) (0.055) (0.005) (0.102)
Malaysia 1980 IPUMS-I: Asia 10,040 0.10% $3,619 32.3% 63.8% 1.25% 29.0 21.0 X -0.058 0.383 -0.009 0.025 -0.434
(0.011) (0.023) (0.109) (0.008) (0.392)
Mexico 1970 PUMS-I: America 26,355 0.26% $4,331 10.0% 76.5% 1.16% 28.4 19.9 X -0.061 0.252 0.204 0.015 0.089
(0.005) (0.011) (0.082) (0.005) (0.244)
Moldova 2005 DHS 1,026 0.01% $3,311 50.5% 18.2% 1.12% 30.1 20.6 X X -0.131 0.801 -0.216 0.070 -0.015
(0.043) (0.027) (0.174) (0.025) (0.463)
Morocco 1992 DHS 1,943 0.02% $2,590 18.9% 68.8% 0.57% 29.7 21.1 X X -0.049 0.227 -0.025 0.029 0.449
$2,500-5,000 GDP/C Bin
(0.024) (0.082) (0.496) (0.018) (0.678)
Morocco 1994 IPUMS-I: Africa 60,890 0.60% $2,626 11.4% 66.0% 1.43% 29.5 20.8 X X -0.058 0.332 0.034 0.021 0.129
(0.004) (0.009) (0.034) (0.003) (0.123)
Morocco 2003 DHS 2,718 0.03% $3,167 11.8% 53.2% 0.58% 29.6 21.0 X X -0.037 0.541 0.188 0.045 -0.175
(0.017) (0.067) (0.200) (0.017) (0.288)
Morocco 2004 IPUMS-I: Africa 60,390 0.60% $3,286 10.4% 53.0% 1.23% 29.6 21.0 X X -0.015 0.487 -0.009 0.034 0.034
(0.003) (0.010) (0.023) (0.003) (0.074)
Mozambique 2011 DHS 3,843 0.04% $2,613 41.6% 63.0% 1.18% 28.5 19.9 X X -0.044 0.425 -0.162 -0.008 0.133
(0.023) (0.034) (0.164) (0.016) (2.278)
Namibia 1992 DHS 988 0.01% $3,335 35.6% 54.2% 0.93% 29.0 21.1 X X -0.085 0.435 -0.669 0.025 -0.792
(0.036) (0.070) (0.263) (0.029) (1.465)
Namibia 2000 DHS 1,108 0.01% $3,652 38.5% 44.2% 1.85% 29.6 21.3 X X -0.208 0.505 -0.035 0.004 -8.258
(0.041) (0.058) (0.305) (0.034) (62.033)
Namibia 2006 DHS 1,413 0.01% $4,277 49.0% 38.3% 1.26% 29.3 21.2 X X -0.134 0.503 -0.132 0.044 -0.848
(0.036) (0.055) (0.255) (0.027) (0.840)
Nicaragua 1971 PUMS-I: America 10,485 0.10% $2,906 17.2% 74.5% 0.77% 28.3 19.5 X -0.112 0.284 -0.052 0.025 -0.169
(0.010) (0.023) (0.145) (0.008) (0.292)
Panama 1970 PUMS-I: America 8,373 0.08% $3,828 23.6% 72.1% 1.28% 28.4 20.0 X -0.152 0.298 0.205 0.008 0.279
(0.012) (0.019) (0.150) (0.009) (1.302)
Panama 1980 PUMS-I: America 10,736 0.11% $4,850 30.4% 62.7% 1.45% 28.9 20.1 X -0.145 0.397 0.026 0.012 -0.279
(0.011) (0.019) (0.094) (0.008) (0.757)
Panama 1990 PUMS-I: America 12,549 0.12% $4,818 29.9% 55.3% 1.44% 29.0 20.2 X -0.153 0.465 0.033 0.046 0.152
(0.009) (0.016) (0.074) (0.008) (0.180)
Paraguay 1982 PUMS-I: America 15,623 0.15% $3,193 15.3% 63.2% 0.97% 28.5 20.6 X -0.112 0.394 0.100 0.020 0.209
(0.007) (0.018) (0.080) (0.007) (0.310)
Paraguay 1990 DHS 1,519 0.02% $3,226 34.2% 60.1% 1.02% 29.1 20.8 X X -0.162 0.422 0.146 0.029 -0.574
(0.030) (0.073) (0.305) (0.023) (0.909)
Paraguay 1992 PUMS-I: America 22,777 0.23% $3,274 19.4% 61.6% 0.97% 29.0 20.6 X -0.127 0.398 -0.010 0.031 0.181
(0.006) (0.015) (0.065) (0.006) (0.177)
Paraguay 2002 PUMS-I: America 24,926 0.25% $2,997 36.8% 56.3% 1.03% 29.3 20.3 X -0.141 0.447 0.050 0.025 -0.089
(0.007) (0.014) (0.068) (0.006) (0.242)
Peru 1991 DHS 3,929 0.04% $3,196 52.8% 56.9% 0.59% 29.1 20.6 X X -0.043 0.439 -0.525 -0.002 11.967
(0.020) (0.053) (0.268) (0.015) (98.079)
Peru 1993 PUMS-I: America 113,466 1.12% $3,220 24.4% 55.1% 0.92% 29.2 20.6 X -0.092 0.449 0.014 0.023 0.037
(0.003) (0.007) (0.030) (0.003) (0.111)
Peru 1996 DHS 7,325 0.07% $3,531 51.3% 55.4% 0.40% 29.3 20.5 X X -0.093 0.496 -0.051 0.031 -0.357
(0.017) (0.039) (0.218) (0.013) (0.493)
Peru 2000 DHS 6,371 0.06% $3,766 57.2% 49.4% 0.48% 29.6 20.6 X X -0.052 0.504 0.012 0.011 -0.243
(0.018) (0.042) (0.186) (0.014) (1.506)
Peru 2007 PUMS-I: America 115,601 1.15% $4,923 34.0% 41.4% 0.94% 29.6 20.4 X -0.095 0.591 -0.024 0.026 0.068
(0.003) (0.006) (0.024) (0.003) (0.107)
Peru 2007 DHS 7,867 0.08% $4,923 67.1% 44.3% 0.64% 29.9 20.4 X X -0.006 0.609 0.097 0.029 0.252
(0.016) (0.044) (0.138) (0.014) (0.528)
Philippines 2008 DHS 2,717 0.03% $2,863 42.3% 54.0% 0.67% 29.5 21.4 X X -0.096 0.452 -0.152 0.011 1.877
(0.023) (0.054) (0.224) (0.018) (3.688)
Philippines 2013 DHS 3,014 0.03% $3,024 42.1% 48.7% 0.54% 29.6 21.3 X X -0.113 0.501 0.262 0.036 0.119
(0.020) (0.066) (0.244) (0.017) (0.521)
Romania 1992 IPUMS-I: Europe 100,657 1.00% $3,191 74.0% 34.4% 0.89% 29.8 20.8 X X -0.192 0.655 -0.065 0.034 -0.075
(0.003) (0.006) (0.023) (0.003) (0.079)
Romania 2002 IPUMS-I: Europe 71,737 0.71% $3,456 54.3% 22.5% 0.87% 30.2 20.7 X X -0.168 0.786 -0.080 0.035 0.083
(0.004) (0.005) (0.025) (0.003) (0.107)
South Africa 1996 IPUMS-I: Africa 133,590 1.32% $3,700 68.2% 47.4% 2.34% 29.7 20.3 X -0.095 0.515 -0.014 0.022 -0.093
(0.003) (0.004) (0.016) (0.002) (0.117)
South Africa 2001 IPUMS-I: Africa 136,950 1.36% $4,005 72.3% 43.2% 2.44% 29.8 20.3 X -0.093 0.559 0.005 0.019 0.221
(0.003) (0.004) (0.014) (0.002) (0.133)
South Africa 2007 IPUMS-I: Africa 33,071 0.33% $4,783 82.3% 39.6% 2.47% 29.7 20.4 X -0.063 0.614 -0.035 0.016 0.096
(0.005) (0.007) (0.024) (0.005) (0.275)
South Africa 1998 DHS 2,067 0.02% $3,812 32.7% 40.0% 0.85% 29.8 20.5 X X -0.134 0.578 -0.149 0.011 1.676
(0.027) (0.042) (0.232) (0.022) (4.276)
Sudan 2008 IPUMS-I: Africa 289,810 2.87% $3,021 24.7% 72.0% 1.47% 28.9 20.1 X -0.009 0.288 0.012 0.018 0.095
(0.003) (0.005) (0.035) (0.002) (0.138)
Swaziland 2006 DHS 851 0.01% $2,967 42.8% 50.2% 0.68% 28.8 20.1 X X -0.088 0.508 -0.030 -0.005 3.471
(0.040) (0.105) (0.440) (0.032) (22.011)
Turkey 1985 IPUMS-I: Asia 150,756 1.49% $4,578 39.2% 57.4% 1.39% 29.0 20.1 X 0.103 0.462 0.293 0.051 -0.045
(0.003) (0.005) (0.024) (0.002) (0.050)
USA 1880 US Full Count 2,391,227 23.70% $3,032 6.2% 64.1% 0.66% 29.0 20.9 -0.023 0.343 0.039 0.009 0.042
(0.000) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.035)
USA 1900 IPUMS-USA 166,412 1.65% $4,161 6.1% 61.3% 0.89% 29.2 21.2 X -0.024 0.374 -0.007 0.011 -0.026
(0.001) (0.006) (0.016) (0.002) (0.104)
Ukraine 2007 DHS 755 0.01% $4,487 72.0% 12.8% 0.57% 30.8 20.7 X X -0.155 0.855 -0.018 0.052 -0.437
(0.055) (0.031) (0.221) (0.026) (0.662)
Uruguay 1963 PUMS-I: America 9,974 0.10% $4,909 17.4% 44.4% 1.02% 29.6 21.8 X -0.062 0.582 0.054 0.039 0.152
(0.008) (0.018) (0.068) (0.009) (0.200)
Uzbekistan 1996 DHS 1,275 0.01% $3,223 46.2% 55.9% 0.78% 28.9 21.2 X X -0.146 0.388 0.070 0.081 0.306
(0.036) (0.052) (0.506) (0.025) (0.392)
Vietnam 2009 IPUMS-I: Asia 745,767 7.39% $3,063 87.2% 20.7% 0.61% 30.2 21.4 X X -0.014 0.790 -0.066 0.084 -0.041
(0.001) (0.003) (0.010) (0.001) (0.012)
Yemen 2013 DHS 6,699 0.07% $3,165 9.4% 69.9% 0.63% 28.6 19.8 X -0.018 0.205 0.015 0.024 -0.578
(0.010) (0.058) (0.267) (0.012) (0.434)
Country
Year 
(#Samples)
Source N
Percent of 
Pooled
Mean GDP/C In Labor Force
3 or More 
Children
2nd Child is 
Multiple Birth
Mother's Age 
at Survey
Mother's Age 
at First Birth
Education?
Month/Quarter 
of Birth?
OLS FS, Twin IV 2S, Twin IV FS, Same-Sex 2S, Same-Sex
Pooled 54 17,091,686 $5,678 16.0% 53.3% 0.95% 29.3 21.0 -0.048 0.480 0.004 0.019 0.006
(0.009) (0.016) (0.009) (0.003) (0.013)
Argentina 1970 PUMS-I: America 19,209 0.11% $7,206 16.4% 45.7% 1.46% 29.6 21.7 X -0.047 0.538 -0.014 0.040 -0.161
(0.006) (0.011) (0.041) (0.007) (0.133)
Argentina 1991 PUMS-I: America 205,654 1.20% $7,173 40.4% 51.8% 1.17% 29.6 21.1 X -0.102 0.482 -0.006 0.031 -0.189
(0.003) (0.005) (0.024) (0.002) (0.079)
Armenia 2001 IPUMS-I: Asia 17,771 0.10% $5,412 71.5% 32.5% 0.81% 29.6 20.7 X X -0.031 0.682 -0.036 0.112 -0.122
(0.008) (0.017) (0.054) (0.006) (0.060)
Azerbaijan 2006 DHS 1,658 0.01% $5,773 12.8% 30.6% 0.55% 29.4 21.3 X X -0.027 0.580 0.178 0.177 0.202
(0.023) (0.075) (0.267) (0.026) (0.121)
Belarus 1999 IPUMS-I: Europe 30,957 0.18% $6,097 83.3% 13.1% 0.67% 30.7 21.2 X -0.092 0.866 -0.011 0.029 -0.096
(0.007) (0.005) (0.028) (0.004) (0.142)
Brazil 1991 PUMS-I: America 475,199 2.78% $5,007 33.1% 48.9% 1.20% 29.3 20.7 X -0.103 0.492 -0.052 0.036 -0.037
(0.002) (0.003) (0.014) (0.001) (0.042)
Brazil 1991 DHS 1,356 0.01% $5,007 44.5% 61.1% 0.60% 29.0 20.4 X X -0.001 0.256 -1.561 0.047 -0.006
(0.041) (0.063) (0.860) (0.029) (0.737)
Brazil 1996 DHS 2,688 0.02% $5,241 46.5% 42.4% 0.77% 29.6 20.6 X X -0.057 0.597 0.216 0.006 3.004
(0.023) (0.056) (0.204) (0.020) (10.848)
Brazil 2000 PUMS-I: America 498,571 2.92% $5,400 51.2% 41.5% 1.25% 29.4 20.4 X -0.104 0.573 -0.052 0.030 -0.037
(0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.001) (0.050)
Brazil 2010 PUMS-I: America 392,152 2.29% $6,879 58.9% 36.4% 1.44% 29.7 19.9 X -0.105 0.630 -0.032 0.028 -0.015
(0.002) (0.003) (0.012) (0.002) (0.065)
Chile 1970 PUMS-I: America 41,509 0.24% $5,241 12.4% 64.1% 1.04% 28.9 20.9 X -0.098 0.399 0.049 0.029 0.070
(0.004) (0.010) (0.043) (0.004) (0.112)
Chile 1982 PUMS-I: America 55,984 0.33% $5,263 18.2% 45.9% 1.19% 29.2 20.7 X -0.088 0.542 -0.015 0.026 -0.009
(0.004) (0.009) (0.027) (0.004) (0.122)
Chile 1992 PUMS-I: America 69,678 0.41% $7,416 20.3% 37.8% 1.29% 29.7 21.1 X -0.079 0.628 -0.062 0.033 0.018
(0.003) (0.006) (0.020) (0.003) (0.092)
Colombia 1993 PUMS-I: America 168,635 0.99% $5,144 28.5% 48.5% 1.53% 29.3 20.4 X -0.126 0.536 0.022 0.031 0.045
(0.002) (0.004) (0.017) (0.002) (0.072)
Colombia 1995 DHS 2,399 0.01% $5,359 45.3% 45.4% 0.60% 29.1 20.5 X X -0.100 0.589 0.410 0.031 0.244
(0.022) (0.044) (0.195) (0.020) (0.697)
Colombia 2000 DHS 2,317 0.01% $5,473 46.8% 41.7% 0.89% 29.3 20.6 X X -0.104 0.608 -0.199 0.010 1.262
(0.023) (0.050) (0.187) (0.021) (3.649)
Colombia 2005 PUMS-I: America 185,928 1.09% $6,116 33.7% 42.6% 1.43% 29.4 20.1 X X -0.134 0.572 -0.016 0.035 -0.013
(0.005) (0.007) (0.033) (0.004) (0.120)
Colombia 2005 DHS 7,234 0.04% $6,116 49.8% 41.4% 0.74% 29.4 20.2 X X -0.097 0.586 0.010 0.029 -0.767
(0.017) (0.026) (0.143) (0.014) (0.631)
Colombia 2010 DHS 9,053 0.05% $7,063 51.8% 35.6% 0.73% 29.4 19.9 X X -0.102 0.644 -0.080 0.026 -0.380
(0.015) (0.023) (0.114) (0.012) (0.528)
Costa Rica 2000 PUMS-I: America 20,566 0.12% $6,046 24.6% 47.3% 1.19% 29.6 20.2 X -0.109 0.516 0.074 0.034 -0.091
(0.007) (0.014) (0.056) (0.006) (0.175)
Dominican Repu 2010 PUMS-I: America 39,222 0.23% $5,379 43.7% 46.1% 1.63% 29.5 20.1 X X -0.087 0.514 -0.026 0.034 -0.044
(0.005) (0.008) (0.038) (0.005) (0.144)
Dominican Repu 2013 DHS 1,818 0.01% $5,379 50.7% 45.5% 1.29% 29.3 19.9 X X -0.076 0.529 -0.161 0.055 -0.386
(0.034) (0.043) (0.239) (0.028) (0.577)
Ecuador 2010 PUMS-I: America 70,502 0.41% $5,050 44.7% 43.7% 0.93% 29.2 20.0 X X -0.109 0.558 -0.057 0.039 -0.048
(0.004) (0.008) (0.035) (0.003) (0.095)
Greece 1971 IPUMS-I: Europe 35,148 0.21% $6,610 22.3% 23.7% 1.31% 30.3 23.2 X 0.015 0.772 0.019 0.065 -0.124
(0.006) (0.006) (0.026) (0.004) (0.069)
Hungary 1990 IPUMS-I: Europe 22,785 0.13% $6,271 64.7% 19.3% 0.96% 30.4 21.2 X -0.303 0.812 -0.098 0.046 -0.333
(0.008) (0.007) (0.037) (0.005) (0.122)
Hungary 2001 IPUMS-I: Europe 16,781 0.10% $7,090 46.5% 25.9% 1.08% 30.4 21.4 X -0.446 0.738 -0.108 0.032 -0.343
(0.007) (0.010) (0.044) (0.006) (0.211)
Iran 2006 IPUMS-I: Asia 59,264 0.35% $5,694 9.1% 35.1% 0.91% 30.2 20.3 X X -0.030 0.665 0.026 0.041 0.142
(0.003) (0.010) (0.024) (0.004) (0.068)
Ireland 1971 IPUMS-I: Europe 8,860 0.05% $6,426 3.6% 59.2% 1.66% 29.1 23.3 X -0.015 0.366 -0.028 0.016 0.473
(0.005) (0.022) (0.037) (0.009) (0.380)
Jordan 2007 DHS 4,244 0.02% $5,290 10.8% 68.9% 1.49% 29.6 21.8 X X -0.080 0.422 -0.059 0.062 0.459
(0.026) (0.050) (0.144) (0.019) (0.297)
Jordan 2009 DHS 3,774 0.02% $5,585 11.9% 65.1% 1.81% 29.5 22.0 X X -0.024 0.339 0.116 0.034 0.730
(0.023) (0.045) (0.171) (0.021) (0.646)
Jordan 2012 DHS 4,169 0.02% $5,647 12.8% 66.6% 1.60% 29.7 22.1 X X -0.091 0.275 -0.139 -0.013 -0.846
(0.025) (0.047) (0.163) (0.020) (1.555)
Kazakhstan 1995 DHS 771 0.00% $5,157 48.7% 35.2% 1.00% 30.0 21.7 X X -0.251 0.601 -0.155 0.025 -0.405
(0.040) (0.046) (0.265) (0.038) (1.474)
Kazakhstan 1999 DHS 885 0.01% $5,456 34.5% 36.2% 0.39% 30.0 21.5 X X -0.197 0.549 0.163 0.098 0.348
(0.037) (0.056) (0.514) (0.035) (0.398)
Malaysia 1991 IPUMS-I: Asia 19,157 0.11% $5,502 30.4% 62.0% 1.43% 29.8 21.8 X X -0.101 0.365 -0.132 0.020 -0.655
(0.008) (0.015) (0.072) (0.006) (0.368)
Mexico 1990 PUMS-I: America 453,455 2.65% $6,067 15.9% 60.5% 1.05% 29.0 20.1 X -0.113 0.402 0.013 0.029 -0.059
(0.001) (0.004) (0.013) (0.001) (0.038)
Mexico 1995 PUMS-I: America 20,788 0.12% $6,381 34.9% 54.2% 0.67% 29.1 20.2 X -0.112 0.534 0.011 0.037 0.002
(0.012) (0.028) (0.098) (0.010) (0.284)
Mexico 2000 PUMS-I: America 602,523 3.53% $6,993 28.5% 49.9% 0.95% 29.2 20.3 X -0.102 0.503 0.041 0.032 -0.083
(0.002) (0.004) (0.016) (0.002) (0.048)
Panama 2000 PUMS-I: America 14,174 0.08% $5,597 36.1% 50.4% 1.39% 29.3 20.3 X -0.155 0.494 0.011 0.026 0.463
(0.009) (0.016) (0.070) (0.008) (0.353)
Panama 2010 PUMS-I: America 14,272 0.08% $6,675 38.4% 47.0% 1.05% 29.4 20.0 X -0.172 0.530 -0.080 0.026 -0.397
(0.009) (0.017) (0.075) (0.008) (0.309)
Peru 2009 DHS 4,832 0.03% $5,505 61.0% 41.8% 0.51% 29.8 20.3 X X -0.032 0.630 -0.343 0.004 5.078
(0.021) (0.033) (0.176) (0.017) (24.287)
Peru 2010 DHS 4,564 0.03% $5,774 60.3% 42.8% 0.96% 29.9 20.2 X X -0.041 0.576 -0.226 0.050 0.083
(0.021) (0.034) (0.214) (0.018) (0.379)
Peru 2011 DHS 4,448 0.03% $5,774 62.3% 40.0% 0.52% 29.9 20.4 X X -0.021 0.534 0.274 0.054 0.284
(0.021) (0.046) (0.200) (0.018) (0.375)
Peru 2012 DHS 4,588 0.03% $5,774 56.4% 39.5% 0.43% 29.9 20.3 X X -0.068 0.544 -0.167 0.034 -0.188
(0.021) (0.058) (0.230) (0.017) (0.564)
South Africa 2011 IPUMS-I: Africa 139,743 0.82% $5,080 74.3% 36.1% 2.30% 29.5 20.7 X X -0.066 0.637 -0.058 0.013 0.099
(0.003) (0.003) (0.013) (0.002) (0.176)
Turkey 1990 IPUMS-I: Asia 163,770 0.96% $5,333 38.5% 51.1% 1.17% 29.4 20.2 X 0.107 0.504 0.200 0.066 0.036
(0.003) (0.005) (0.023) (0.002) (0.036)
Turkey 1993 DHS 2,349 0.01% $5,648 33.0% 47.3% 0.55% 29.4 20.3 X X -0.080 0.440 0.146 0.109 -0.203
(0.022) (0.051) (0.322) (0.019) (0.183)
Turkey 1998 DHS 2,093 0.01% $6,215 29.3% 42.3% 1.02% 29.2 20.6 X X -0.054 0.531 0.043 0.079 -0.097
(0.025) (0.044) (0.209) (0.022) (0.278)
Turkey 2000 IPUMS-I: Asia 180,069 1.05% $6,358 38.2% 42.6% 1.36% 29.6 20.7 X 0.073 0.599 0.150 0.070 -0.013
(0.002) (0.004) (0.017) (0.002) (0.033)
Turkey 2003 DHS 2,579 0.02% $6,841 22.4% 43.1% 0.72% 29.5 20.5 X X -0.049 0.672 0.053 0.091 0.078
(0.021) (0.051) (0.165) (0.020) (0.209)
USA 1910 US Full Count 3,632,151 21.25% $5,022 11.8% 56.9% 0.67% 29.1 21.2 -0.013 0.428 0.054 0.011 0.062
(0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.032)
USA 1920 US Full Count 4,500,300 26.33% $5,595 7.7% 56.6% 1.03% 29.3 21.2 -0.033 0.442 -0.004 0.013 0.019
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.020)
USA 1930 US Full Count 4,826,615 28.24% $5,948 8.6% 53.4% 0.85% 29.5 21.0 -0.047 0.478 -0.002 0.018 0.038
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.015)
Uruguay 1975 PUMS-I: America 10,546 0.06% $5,368 24.2% 43.2% 1.09% 29.6 21.7 X -0.082 0.572 -0.149 0.050 0.246
(0.009) (0.017) (0.060) (0.009) (0.176)
Uruguay 1985 PUMS-I: America 11,929 0.07% $5,926 36.1% 42.4% 1.05% 29.6 21.3 X -0.119 0.583 -0.025 0.041 -0.278
(0.009) (0.017) (0.073) (0.008) (0.215)
$5,000-7,500 GDP/C Bin
Country
Year 
(#Samples)
Source N
Percent of 
Pooled
Mean GDP/C In Labor Force
3 or More 
Children
2nd Child is 
Multiple Birth
Mother's Age 
at Survey
Mother's Age 
at First Birth
Education?
Month/Quarter of 
Birth?
OLS FS, Twin IV 2S, Twin IV FS, Same-Sex 2S, Same-Sex
Pooled 19 6,180,681 $8,004 15.8% 46.9% 0.98% 29.5 20.9 -0.075 0.535 -0.024 0.024 0.057
(0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.002) (0.014)
Argentina 1980 IPUMS-I: Americas 135,408 2.19% $7,826 20.4% 47.7% 1.38% 29.3 21.8 X -0.079 0.530 -0.050 0.043 0.103
(0.003) (0.006) (0.021) (0.003) (0.068)
Argentina 2001 IPUMS-I: Americas 150,620 2.44% $8,049 49.1% 50.0% 1.22% 29.4 20.6 X -0.116 0.509 -0.055 0.023 -0.133
(0.003) (0.005) (0.023) (0.002) (0.110)
Armenia 2005 DHS 1,315 0.02% $8,617 21.5% 25.5% 0.89% 29.4 20.6 X X -0.062 0.844 -0.207 0.110 0.136
(0.035) (0.076) (0.060) (0.028) (0.262)
Costa Rica 2011 IPUMS-I: Americas 17,905 0.29% $7,997 34.9% 34.1% 0.99% 29.6 19.9 X -0.096 0.656 0.009 0.033 0.056
(0.008) (0.014) (0.055) (0.007) (0.212)
France 1962 IPUMS-I: Europe 92,331 1.49% $8,073 20.3% 49.3% 2.68% 30.1 22.2 X -0.124 0.519 -0.103 0.026 -0.173
(0.003) (0.004) (0.014) (0.003) (0.100)
Greece 1981 IPUMS-I: Europe 45,467 0.74% $8,897 21.3% 24.0% 1.19% 29.7 22.0 X X -0.024 0.761 -0.011 0.063 -0.046
(0.005) (0.005) (0.023) (0.004) (0.060)
Ireland 1981 IPUMS-I: Europe 13,484 0.22% $8,641 8.9% 53.2% 1.28% 29.4 22.8 X -0.070 0.456 0.031 0.040 0.126
(0.006) (0.017) (0.051) (0.008) (0.128)
Ireland 1986 IPUMS-I: Europe 12,809 0.21% $9,597 16.7% 50.6% 1.12% 29.6 22.7 -0.100 0.481 -0.038 0.058 -0.105
(0.007) (0.020) (0.062) (0.008) (0.112)
Malaysia 2000 IPUMS-I: Asia 20,415 0.33% $7,759 34.1% 57.9% 1.66% 30.2 22.4 X -0.080 0.461 0.209 0.028 -0.680
(0.008) (0.014) (0.056) (0.006) (0.264)
Mexico 2010 IPUMS-I: Americas 644,685 10.43% $7,716 33.7% 43.4% 0.94% 29.5 20.3 X -0.111 0.582 -0.004 0.030 0.083
(0.003) (0.006) (0.020) (0.002) (0.089)
Portugal 1981 IPUMS-I: Europe 19,031 0.31% $7,979 46.3% 29.0% 1.02% 29.9 22.1 X -0.141 0.703 -0.045 0.043 0.252
(0.008) (0.011) (0.051) (0.006) (0.174)
Puerto Rico 1980 IPUMS-PR 8,246 0.13% $7,918 35.1% 51.7% 1.84% 29.3 21.0 X X -0.167 0.465 -0.062 0.048 -0.191
(0.011) (0.018) (0.082) (0.010) (0.216)
USA 1940 US Full Count 4,602,622 74.47% $7,942 10.6% 47.1% 0.86% 29.5 20.9 X -0.064 0.539 -0.016 0.021 0.072
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.014)
USA 1950 IPUMS-USA 103,494 1.67% $9,643 14.0% 43.1% 1.02% 29.3 21.7 X -0.079 0.588 -0.042 0.024 0.117
(0.002) (0.006) (0.015) (0.003) (0.093)
Uruguay 1996 IPUMS-I: Americas 11,642 0.19% $8,086 54.8% 39.9% 1.22% 29.9 21.3 X -0.117 0.584 -0.019 0.029 -0.195
(0.010) (0.017) (0.071) (0.008) (0.311)
Uruguay 2006 IPUMS-I: Americas 9,121 0.15% $9,084 62.8% 41.0% 1.24% 30.0 20.6 X -0.148 0.563 -0.076 0.027 -0.306
(0.013) (0.028) (0.100) (0.011) (0.459)
Venezuela 1981 IPUMS-I: Americas 80,451 1.30% $9,827 26.1% 60.9% 2.36% 28.6 20.4 X -0.134 0.380 -0.012 0.029 0.062
(0.004) (0.005) (0.026) (0.003) (0.106)
Venezuela 1990 IPUMS-I: Americas 98,117 1.59% $8,785 32.1% 56.0% 2.35% 29.1 20.3 X -0.152 0.427 -0.075 0.030 -0.157
(0.004) (0.005) (0.026) (0.003) (0.113)
Venezuela 2001 IPUMS-I: Americas 113,518 1.84% $8,138 33.5% 49.5% 1.45% 29.3 20.1 X -0.132 0.518 -0.043 0.035 0.064
(0.003) (0.005) (0.022) (0.003) (0.081)
$7,500-10,000 GDP/C Bin
Country
Year 
(#Samples)
Source N
Percent of 
Pooled
Mean GDP/C In Labor Force
3 or More 
Children
2nd Child is 
Multiple Birth
Mother's Age 
at Survey
Mother's Age 
at First Birth
Education?
Month/Quarter 
of Birth?
OLS FS, Twin IV 2S, Twin IV FS, Same-Sex 2S, Same-Sex
Pooled 19 1,062,881 $11,484 30.4% 45.1% 1.42% 29.7 21.5 -0.126 0.521 -0.063 0.035 -0.066
(0.015) (0.047) (0.018) (0.002) (0.021)
Armenia 2010 DHS 1,178 0.11% $10,215 22.5% 19.9% 0.73% 29.6 21.2 X X -0.061 0.810 0.072 0.125 -0.233
(0.038) (0.040) (0.207) (0.025) (0.235)
Armenia 2011 IPUMS-I: Asia 15,059 1.42% $10,215 47.4% 22.7% 0.93% 29.7 21.4 X X -0.012 0.794 -0.111 0.107 -0.088
(0.010) (0.013) (0.051) (0.006) (0.076)
Austria 1971 IPUMS-I: Europe 30,982 2.91% $10,195 34.3% 40.9% 1.04% 29.4 21.6 X -0.076 0.594 -0.055 0.026 -0.060
(0.006) (0.010) (0.044) (0.005) (0.210)
Austria 1981 IPUMS-I: Europe 27,991 2.63% $13,779 43.6% 29.9% 1.00% 29.8 21.2 X -0.102 0.697 -0.143 0.042 -0.253
(0.007) (0.008) (0.041) (0.005) (0.140)
Chile 2002 PUMS-I: America 56,760 5.34% $10,777 31.4% 31.1% 0.94% 30.4 20.8 X -0.081 0.688 -0.044 0.026 -0.187
(0.004) (0.007) (0.028) (0.004) (0.149)
France 1968 IPUMS-I: Europe 95,250 8.96% $10,432 24.5% 46.6% 1.05% 30.0 22.3 X -0.153 0.539 -0.084 0.033 -0.104
(0.003) (0.006) (0.024) (0.003) (0.082)
France 1975 IPUMS-I: Europe 103,331 9.72% $13,254 36.9% 38.9% 1.13% 29.4 21.8 X -0.249 0.607 -0.172 0.026 0.088
(0.003) (0.006) (0.021) (0.003) (0.120)
Greece 1991 IPUMS-I: Europe 40,657 3.83% $10,062 37.0% 21.8% 1.22% 30.3 21.5 X X -0.080 0.781 -0.054 0.059 -0.035
(0.006) (0.005) (0.027) (0.004) (0.081)
Greece 2001 IPUMS-I: Europe 28,882 2.72% $12,660 51.6% 20.4% 1.13% 31.1 22.5 X -0.070 0.801 -0.086 0.042 0.038
(0.007) (0.006) (0.034) (0.005) (0.139)
Ireland 1991 IPUMS-I: Europe 10,937 1.03% $11,843 31.3% 45.7% 1.24% 30.0 22.7 X -0.144 0.550 -0.096 0.060 -0.279
(0.010) (0.021) (0.068) (0.008) (0.146)
Portugal 1991 IPUMS-I: Europe 15,987 1.50% $10,872 63.3% 22.8% 1.15% 30.7 21.5 X -0.184 0.771 -0.046 0.021 0.120
(0.010) (0.009) (0.047) (0.006) (0.375)
Portugal 2001 IPUMS-I: Europe 11,704 1.10% $13,831 74.5% 16.8% 1.13% 31.2 22.2 X -0.144 0.866 -0.061 0.026 -0.559
(0.012) (0.010) (0.045) (0.007) (0.330)
Portugal 2011 IPUMS-I: Europe 8,445 0.79% $14,279 80.7% 17.2% 1.35% 31.6 22.8 X -0.164 0.851 -0.017 0.025 -0.225
(0.013) (0.011) (0.042) (0.008) (0.331)
Puerto Rico 1990 IPUMS-PR 8,442 0.79% $10,477 41.7% 47.0% 1.42% 29.7 20.9 X -0.148 0.509 -0.096 0.055 0.011
(0.012) (0.018) (0.089) (0.011) (0.204)
Puerto Rico 2000 IPUMS-PR 7,809 0.73% $13,881 43.1% 40.7% 1.41% 29.7 21.0 X -0.106 0.561 -0.193 0.042 -0.458
(0.013) (0.020) (0.084) (0.011) (0.283)
Spain 1991 IPUMS-I: Europe 59,957 5.64% $12,030 40.0% 23.2% 1.07% 31.1 22.4 X -0.112 0.768 -0.095 0.045 -0.051
(0.005) (0.006) (0.024) (0.003) (0.088)
USA 1960 IPUMS-USA 470,378 44.26% $11,380 22.8% 55.1% 1.70% 29.3 21.4 X X -0.117 0.452 -0.033 0.035 -0.084
(0.001) (0.002) (0.010) (0.001) (0.034)
Uruguay 2011 PUMS-I: America 10,012 0.94% $11,526 65.7% 36.5% 0.88% 30.1 20.5 X X -0.142 0.628 -0.016 0.026 -0.478
(0.011) (0.020) (0.080) (0.009) (0.380)
Venezuela 1971 PUMS-I: America 59,120 5.56% $10,429 16.0% 70.5% 2.28% 28.4 20.1 X -0.083 0.289 -0.044 0.017 0.416
(0.004) (0.006) (0.034) (0.003) (0.207)
$10,000-15,000 GDP/C Bin
Country
Year 
(#Samples)
Source N
Percent of 
Pooled
Mean GDP/C In Labor Force
3 or More 
Children
2nd Child is 
Multiple Birth
Mother's Age 
at Survey
Mother's Age 
at First Birth
Education?
Month/Quarter 
of Birth?
OLS FS, Twin IV 2S, Twin IV FS, Same-Sex 2S, Same-Sex
Pooled 13 1,053,271 $17,532 52.0% 34.8% 1.24% 30.2 21.8 -0.206 0.651 -0.083 0.046 -0.143
(0.029) (0.031) (0.020) (0.004) (0.018)
Austria 1991 IPUMS-I: Europe 28,036 2.66% $16,956 51.4% 24.7% 0.93% 30.2 21.8 X -0.117 0.763 -0.136 0.036 -0.232
(0.007) (0.008) (0.040) (0.005) (0.167)
France 1982 IPUMS-I: Europe 117,660 11.17% $15,076 52.2% 33.5% 1.08% 30.3 22.0 X -0.339 0.663 -0.212 0.041 -0.243
(0.003) (0.005) (0.020) (0.003) (0.068)
France 1990 IPUMS-I: Europe 91,261 8.66% $17,309 64.1% 34.1% 1.04% 30.7 22.4 X -0.357 0.656 -0.207 0.042 -0.160
(0.003) (0.006) (0.025) (0.003) (0.072)
France 1999 IPUMS-I: Europe 86,473 8.21% $19,690 68.1% 29.6% 1.24% 31.3 23.5 X -0.279 0.706 -0.061 0.039 -0.203
(0.004) (0.006) (0.020) (0.003) (0.076)
Great Britain 1991 IPUMS-I: Europe 20,003 1.90% $16,403 46.2% 32.1% 1.11% 30.3 22.5 -0.222 0.705 -0.160 0.079 -0.232
(0.008) (0.012) (0.045) (0.006) (0.086)
Ireland 1996 IPUMS-I: Europe 9,165 0.87% $15,683 43.1% 39.8% 1.16% 30.2 22.9 X -0.172 0.634 -0.065 0.064 -0.217
(0.011) (0.019) (0.076) (0.009) (0.156)
Puerto Rico 2010 IPUMS-PR 4,397 0.42% $15,074 57.1% 36.0% 1.39% 30.0 20.8 X X -0.159 0.635 -0.149 0.064 -0.070
(0.018) (0.029) (0.106) (0.014) (0.243)
Spain 2001 IPUMS-I: Europe 34,927 3.32% $15,874 51.2% 16.2% 2.31% 31.9 23.7 X X -0.066 0.882 -0.025 0.034 -0.072
(0.007) (0.003) (0.020) (0.004) (0.156)
Spain 2011 IPUMS-I: Europe 39,595 3.76% $16,797 87.7% 15.0% 1.05% 32.0 24.7 X X -0.098 0.864 -0.016 0.029 0.132
(0.009) (0.007) (0.027) (0.005) (0.171)
Switzerland 1970 IPUMS-I: Europe 11,998 1.14% $16,668 21.8% 35.6% 0.81% 30.2 23.2 X -0.083 0.655 -0.075 0.019 -0.230
(0.008) (0.016) (0.058) (0.008) (0.403)
Switzerland 1980 IPUMS-I: Europe 11,241 1.07% $18,315 28.4% 23.1% 0.70% 30.8 23.1 X -0.079 0.790 -0.167 0.042 -0.339
(0.010) (0.011) (0.048) (0.008) (0.202)
USA 1970 IPUMS-USA 93,241 8.85% $15,334 33.4% 52.5% 1.41% 29.3 20.8 X X -0.139 0.463 0.014 0.034 -0.105
(0.003) (0.006) (0.028) (0.003) (0.088)
USA 1980 IPUMS-USA 505,274 47.97% $18,487 49.3% 36.5% 1.27% 29.8 21.1 X X -0.177 0.621 -0.075 0.053 -0.127
(0.001) (0.002) (0.010) (0.001) (0.026)
$15,000-20,000 GDP/C Bin
Country Year (#Samples) Source N Percent of 
Pooled
Mean GDP/C In Labor Force 3 or More 
Children
2nd Child is 
Multiple Birth
Mother's Age at 
Survey
Mother's Age at 
First Birth
Education? Month/Quarter 
of Birth?
OLS FS, Twins 2S, Twins FS, Same-Sex 2S, Same-Sex
Pooled 11 2,377,681 $24,420 67.8% 33.2% 1.45% 30.7 22.8 -0.191 0.668 -0.085 0.044 -0.140
(0.024) (0.016) (0.008) (0.003) (0.015)
Austria 2001 IPUMS-I: Europe 24,022 1.01% $20,997 72.7% 23.6% 1.00% 31.1 22.8 X -0.127 0.781 -0.153 0.041 -0.200
(0.007) (0.009) (0.041) (0.005) (0.140)
France 2006 IPUMS-I: Europe 510,203 21.46% $21,540 73.3% 28.8% 1.43% 31.3 24.0 X -0.263 0.707 -0.100 0.037 -0.210
(0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.001) (0.034)
France 2011 IPUMS-I: Europe 485,266 20.41% $21,477 76.2% 29.3% 1.46% 31.2 24.1 X -0.248 0.702 -0.105 0.038 -0.156
(0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.001) (0.032)
Ireland 2002 IPUMS-I: Europe 7,664 0.32% $22,315 45.8% 35.4% 1.55% 30.2 23.0 X -0.180 0.663 -0.158 0.037 -0.097
(0.013) (0.018) (0.067) (0.010) (0.300)
Ireland 2006 IPUMS-I: Europe 8,025 0.34% $24,076 55.6% 32.8% 1.37% 30.0 22.9 X -0.182 0.681 0.036 0.047 -0.128
(0.013) (0.018) (0.070) (0.010) (0.231)
Ireland 2011 IPUMS-I: Europe 10,654 0.45% $22,013 62.0% 34.0% 1.40% 31.3 23.7 X -0.176 0.680 -0.188 0.048 0.172
(0.011) (0.013) (0.059) (0.009) (0.200)
Switzerland 1990 IPUMS-I: Europe 10,612 0.45% $20,699 38.7% 26.7% 1.05% 31.0 23.8 X -0.116 0.751 -0.022 0.043 -0.274
(0.011) (0.012) (0.058) (0.008) (0.213)
Switzerland 2000 IPUMS-I: Europe 8,685 0.37% $22,122 61.0% 26.1% 1.01% 31.7 24.6 X -0.152 0.763 -0.164 0.043 0.143
(0.012) (0.016) (0.069) (0.009) (0.244)
USA 1990 IPUMS-USA 505,189 21.25% $22,901 60.6% 35.7% 1.28% 30.2 21.7 X -0.166 0.647 -0.084 0.051 -0.134
(0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.001) (0.030)
USA 2000 IPUMS-USA 438,854 18.46% $28,100 62.8% 36.5% 1.58% 30.3 21.9 X -0.136 0.638 -0.073 0.049 -0.102
(0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.033)
USA 2010 IPUMS-USA 368,507 15.50% $30,491 66.2% 38.1% 1.57% 30.4 21.9 X X -0.141 0.622 -0.049 0.048 -0.125
(0.002) (0.003) (0.012) (0.002) (0.040)
$20,000 and Above GDP/C Bin
